

SIPRI
YEARBOOK
2002

**ARMAMENTS,
DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY**

sipri

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament.

It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden's 150 years of unbroken peace.

The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body.

The objectives of SIPRI's research are

- to promote transparency in security and arms control
- to contribute to conflict prevention and resolution
- to disseminate information to the broader public.

SIPRI publishes its research findings in books and on the Internet at <http://www.sipri.org>.

This booklet illustrates the type of facts and data you will find in the 845-page

SIPRI Yearbook 2002
Armaments, Disarmament and
International Security

which may be obtained through all the main bookshops or from Oxford University Press, UK.

On the Internet, order from OUP through SIPRI at <http://www.sipri.org/pubs/bookorder.html>.

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About the

'Like many organizations, research institutes, researchers and individuals in the field of security, the Department for Disarmament Affairs has set store on the reliability and credibility of the research and publications emanating from SIPRI, particularly the Yearbook that the Institute has published for many years. As an independent institute for research on problems of peace and conflict, disarmament and arms control, founded in 1966, SIPRI's primary research has always been consistently objective, timely, comprehensive and clear.'

Jayantha Dhanapala
United Nations Under-Secretary-General
for Disarmament Affairs

SIPRI Yearbook

The SIPRI Yearbook has been published since 1969. It brings together objective data and state-of-the-art analysis, offered by SIPRI's own staff and other experts, on all major aspects of arms control, peace and security. The pattern of the Yearbook contents varies from year to year to take account of key developments and concerns in the year covered. Thus, the *SIPRI Yearbook 2002* is heavily influenced by the cataclysmic terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It aims to explain the full significance and worldwide repercussions of these events, and it discusses how arms control and other security policies may need to be retooled to deal with the new transnational threats to society.

Putting this unique compendium into the hands of governments, scholars and others who care about peace is a contribution in itself to transparency, democratic debate and good policy making. With these aims in mind, SIPRI has in recent years produced Russian, Ukrainian, Chinese and Korean editions of the Yearbook.

Major armed conflicts

- There were 24 major armed conflicts in 2001—conflicts over control of government or territory in which at least 1000 battle-related deaths were recorded for any single year.
 - Only 1 of these conflicts—between India and Pakistan—was interstate. All the others were internal conflicts.
 - Over 1000 people were killed in each of 11 conflicts in 2001. For 9 of them, over 1000 battle-related deaths were also recorded for 2000.
 - Eleven of the conflicts have been active for over 8 years, mainly because neither side has been able to prevail by force.
 - Eleven of the conflicts have spilled over international borders. They threatened to destabilize neighbouring states through the burden of refugees, cross-border movement of rebels (and occasionally national military forces), and the undermining of legitimate economic and political structures through the illicit trade in resources and arms.
 - The general pattern of conflict in 2001 was consistent with that of previous years, but the priorities and perceptions of many states changed as a result of the 11 September terrorist attacks on the USA. The campaign against terrorism directly influenced a small number of conflicts and brought to the fore

such issues as the militarization of responses to terrorism, the global role of violent sub-state actors, and the connection between intra- and interstate conflict.

The 24 conflicts in 2001

Africa

Algeria*
Angola*
Burundi*
Congo, Democratic
 Republic of the
Rwanda*
Somalia
Sudan*

America

Colombia*
Peru
USA*

Asia

Afghanistan*
India—2 conflicts
 (Kashmir*)
India—Pakistan
Indonesia
Myanmar
Philippines—2 conflicts
Sri Lanka*

Europe

Russia*

Middle East

Iran
Iraq
Israel
Turkey

* These 11 conflicts each caused 1000 or more deaths in 2001—5 were in Africa and 3 in Asia. The conflict in the USA refers to that between the al-Qaeda network and the USA, the only new conflict registered for 2001.

Multilateral peace missions

- There were 51 peace missions in operation in 2001, as compared to 55 in 2000. For the first time since 1996, no new United Nations missions were initiated.

- The missions were conducted or led by:

- the UN* (15 peacekeeping operations)

- UN operations not officially defined by the UN as peacekeeping operations* (4)

- the OSCE* (13)

- the CIS* (3, of which 1 was carried out by Russia);

- NATO* (4)

- the EU/WEU* (3)

- the OAU* (3); and

- other organizations or ad hoc state coalitions* (6).

- In December 2001, 39 466 military and 7642 civilian police personnel were deployed in the 15 UN operations, an increase of 9375 (25%) over 2000. There were 64 fatalities in these operations. The total cost of the missions was \$1931.5 million, a decrease of \$508.8 million (21%) from 2000.

- By comparison, 32 missions were conducted by regional organizations and multinational coalitions other than the UN in 2001. The known total cost of these missions was \$298.1 million and there were 40 fatalities.

The military dimension of the European Union

- The EU has pursued its 'Headline Goal' for the European Security and Defence Policy since 1999: to be able by 2003 to deploy a corps-level European Rapid Reaction Force for crisis management missions—the 'Petersberg tasks'.

- US policy after the 11 September 2001 attacks brought home to the EU the reality of its role in the transatlantic relationship. Europe will be pressured to improve its military capabilities in both the EU and NATO.

- New ESDP responsibilities were called for, including emphasis on preparation for operational readiness, taking full account of the terrorist threat to European forces and civilian populations, and improvement of the early-warning process.

- The issue of EU access to NATO's assets remained unresolved, and the duplication of efforts by the EU and NATO has not been sufficiently addressed. A synergistic, rational approach to defence spending is lacking in Europe.

- The ESDP was declared 'operational' in 2001 and 3 permanent bodies were established. Defining the ESDP and building public support for increased spending will pose a challenge in the coming years.

The challenges of security sector reform

- States aspiring to democratic governance and strong economies require capable administrative and political structures. They need a well-governed security sector—comprising the civil, political and security institutions responsible for protecting the state and its citizens.

- Security sector reform helps to reduce the risk that state weakness or failure will lead to disorder and violence. Supporting such reform should be a priority objective for governments and scholars alike.

- When states cannot manage developments within their borders, the conditions are created for disorder and violence and the spillover of conflicts to other states.

- Fresh demands are now being placed on the armed forces, intelligence services and law-enforcement services of states to help in identifying groups and individuals engaged in terrorist acts. There is a risk that security sector reform will become subordinate to anti-terrorism activities in countries where development of this cooperation is seen as particularly important. Reform may also be impeded by an increase of the political influence and institutional autonomy of security services.

Sanctions applied by the EU and the UN

- In 2001 the European Union and the United Nations continued to work to improve the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument for managing international security problems. Sanctions are now applied not only to target states but also to non-state entities and, increasingly, to individuals.

- The EU has been developing sanctions to advance its objectives in the process of democratization and human rights. EU sanctions achieved some success in South-Eastern Europe when they were used as part of a broader set of security-building measures.

- The UN sanctions regime against Iraq was modified in 2001 in response to concerns about the humanitarian impact on the Iraqi people. The UN Security Council could previously block any shipment to Iraq unless it was for humanitarian purposes. Under the new system only sales of items on an agreed list may be blocked.

- Before 2001 UN mandatory sanctions against certain states, including Afghanistan, were part of the international response to acts of terrorism. After the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Security Council agreed on extensive measures aimed at all entities or persons engaged in supporting or carrying out terrorist acts.

Military expenditure

- World military expenditure in 2001, based on adopted budgets, amounted to \$839 billion (in current dollars). This figure represents 2.6% of world GDP and an average of \$137 per capita.

- The trend in world military spending has changed from a significant reduction over the period 1987–98 to an increase of 7% in real terms over the period 1998–2001.

- When actual expenditure figures for 2001 become available, the world increase is likely to be greater—owing primarily to an increase in the USA—because of additional expenditure generated by the 11 September terrorist attacks and the ensuing ‘war on terrorism’. Several countries have also adopted significant increases for counter-terrorism activities in their defence and internal security budgets for 2002.

- Five countries accounted for over half of world military spending in 2001—the USA (36%), Russia (6%), and France, Japan and the UK (5% each).

- In the group of low-income countries, the defence burden—military expenditure as a share of GDP—is more than twice as high as the world average.

US military expenditure

- The USA began a major military build-up after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the fourth such build-up since World War II. In late 2001 the US Congress authorized a supplementary appropriation of \$40 billion to be applied to anti-terrorism in FYs 2001 and 2002. The US budget for FY 2003 contained an increase of \$48 billion in budget authority for defence, a sum that is larger than the entire defence budget of each of the other major military spenders—Russia, France, Japan and the UK.

- The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review articulated broad objectives for the technological transformation of the US military but contained no budgetary or military policy guidance. Disputes will therefore continue to dominate the budgetary process.

- The defence budget for FY 2003 continues almost all the so-called legacy programmes that were developed in the context of the cold war.

- The 11 September attacks raised the profile of the issue of NATO burden sharing. The gap between US and European spending for defence reflects a difference in perceptions of the role of military strength for promoting peace and security.

Arms production

- The 1990s was a decade of profound change and restructuring of the arms industry in most parts of the world.

- The arms industry was significantly downsized in the first half of the decade, but this process slowed down considerably in the latter half of the decade.

- Since the late 1990s arms procurement has stabilized and in a number of countries there has even been slight growth. Restructuring of the arms industry has been driven by large companies trying to secure their strong positions in the world market through acquisitions and international cooperation arrangements.

- The process of concentration has produced several extraordinarily large companies, with annual arms sales of \$5–19 billion. In Europe, concentration has moved from the national to the international level. Internationalization in Europe is seen as a prerequisite for Europe both to become competitive with the USA and to establish military industrial partnerships with US companies.

- Increased concentration and internationalization of arms production may require international measures to ensure transparency and accountability in arms production in the future.

- The value of the combined arms sales of the top 100 arms-producing companies in the OECD member states and the developing countries (excluding China) was \$157.6 billion in 2000.

The 5 largest arms-producing companies in the OECD countries in 2000

Aggregate value of arms sales, \$66.7 billion

1 Lockheed Martin (USA)	\$18.6 billion
2 Boeing (USA)	\$16.9 billion
3 BAE Systems (UK)	\$14.4 billion
4 Raytheon (USA)	\$10.1 billion
5 Northrop Grumman (USA)	\$6.7 billion

- Russian arms production has been increasing since 1998. The efforts to transform the Russian arms industry are beginning to produce changes in its structure, ownership and dynamics.

The 5 largest arms-producing companies in Russia in 2000

Aggregate value of arms sales, 46.2 billion roubles

1 PK Antey	R 12.8 billion
2 KnAAPO	R 11.4 billion
3 Severnaya Verf	R 10.5 billion
4 Baltiysky Zavod	R 6.5 billion
5 IAIA	R 5.0 billion

International arms transfers


- The global SIPRI trend-indicator value of international transfers of major conventional weapons in 2001 was more than \$16 billion, an increase of 7% over 2000.
- In 2001 Russia was the largest arms supplier, with a 24% increase over 2000. The USA ranks as the second largest supplier.
- The level of global arms transfers for the 5-year period 1997–2001 dropped from the previous 5-year period, mainly because of the reduction in deliveries by the USA. The USA was the dominant supplier and Russian the second largest in 1997–2001. The two largest recipients were Taiwan and China.
- For 1997–2001 the most important arms transfers in terms of volume were between Taiwan and the USA and between China and Russia.
- The actual financial value of the global arms trade in 2000—the latest year for which figures are available—was \$27–33 billion, an estimate based on official government and industry data on arms exports.
- India and Pakistan are both major recipients of arms, ranking 5th and 10th respectively, for the period 1997–2001. Both states have received weapons or have weapon acquisition plans that could be destabilizing.

The top 5 exporters of major conventional weapons in 1997–2001

Shares of world exports

1	USA	44%
2	Russia	17%
3	France	10%
4	UK	7%
5	Germany	5%

The trend in transfers of major conventional weapons, 1987–2001



The columns show annual totals.

The curve shows 5-year moving averages, plotted at the last year of each 5-year period.

Arms control after the attacks of 11 September 2001

- Events in 2001 led practitioners and observers to question the usefulness of arms control as an instrument for managing security problems. The two key events were the change in the US administration and the 11 September terrorist attacks.

- During its first year the George W. Bush Administration critically scrutinized and reassessed the role of arms control in US foreign, security and defence policy, based on concern about responses to violations of agreements and whether arms control can modify the behaviour of key states.

- US policies stimulated wider discussion of how arms control can contribute to international security. Most would agree that there is a close correlation between states that sponsor or carry out terrorist acts and those that seek to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.

- While arms control remains one of the instruments used to manage international security, adaptations will be required if it is to address the problems of greatest current concern. The problems include how to facilitate participation by the private sector in arms control and how to apply arms control to non-state armed groups.

Ballistic missile defence and nuclear arms control

- In December 2001 the United States gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. As of 13 June 2002 the ABM Treaty is no longer in force.

- The US decision cleared the way for the USA to develop a BMD system larger in scale and scope than the limited system envisaged by the Clinton Administration. The reaction from Russia, China and US allies was restrained.

- In November 2001 Russia and the USA agreed to negotiate a new arms reduction treaty under which each state would by the year 2012 reduce its strategic offensive nuclear forces to 1700–2200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads.

- On 24 May 2002 Russia and the USA signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. The treaty did not require that warheads removed from service be destroyed, raising concern over reduced confidence and greater unpredictability in their nuclear force postures.

**World nuclear forces:
numbers of warheads as of January 2002**

	<i>Year of first nuclear test</i>	<i>Deployed warheads</i>
USA	1945	7 600
Russia	1949	8 331
UK	1952	185
France	1960	348
China	1964	402
India	1974	30–35
Pakistan	1998	24–48
Israel	—	c. 20
<i>Total</i>		<i>c. 17 150</i>

The USA's active deployed stockpile consists of 6480 strategic and 1120 non-strategic warheads.

Russia's active deployed stockpile consists of 4951 strategic and 3380 non-strategic warheads.

The nuclear arsenals of India, Israel and Pakistan are thought to be only partly deployed.

- At the beginning of 2002 an estimated total of about 17 150 nuclear warheads were deployed by 8 states. If all nuclear warheads are counted—including non-deployed spares, those in active and inactive storage, and 'pits' (plutonium cores) held in reserve—the total world stockpile consisted of c. 36 800 warheads.

Tactical nuclear weapons

- Despite the political commitments made by Russia and the USA under the 1991–92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives to reduce and consolidate their inventories of tactical nuclear weapons, both states continue to maintain large stockpiles.

- Tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles are non-transparent and are not regulated by any legally binding agreement. There is considerable uncertainty about both the number of weapons and their deployment locations.

- Because of their small size, transportability and decentralized command and control arrangements, tactical nuclear weapons pose special dangers of illicit diversion or use. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, there has been particular concern that tactical nuclear weapons could be acquired by terrorist groups.

- Recent doctrinal changes have stimulated renewed interest in the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons and created pressure to develop new types of weapons.

- There is an urgent need for Russia and the USA to ensure that tactical nuclear weapons are safely and securely stored. They should also conclude a legally binding agreement regulating and reducing their inventories.

US and Russian nuclear warhead production complexes and the security of nuclear facilities and materials

- There are 284 nuclear research reactors in 55 countries and 472 power reactors (operating or under construction) in 31 countries. The attacks of 11 September 2001 suggest that the threat to nuclear facilities is very complex.

- There is no multilateral treaty requiring physical protection of these facilities or the nuclear material used or stored for use by them. An international effort is urgently needed to evaluate physical protection standards and regulatory practices and to consider whether new norms are needed.

- The current US–Russian programmes to improve the security of Russian nuclear facilities and materials should be continued.

- The Russian and US nuclear warhead production complexes have undergone a radical down-sizing and restructuring but they retain facilities for the design, testing and production of warheads.

- The Russian complex has not been adequately reduced because of insufficient funding and difficulties in finding alternative employment for displaced workers. International cooperation could accelerate the contraction and rationalization of this complex.

The military uses of outer space

- Space-based systems are becoming an increasingly important component of military power.

- The ‘weaponization’ of outer space has reappeared on the arms control agenda, with growing international concern that the USA’s ability to dominate space and deny its use to other countries will give rise to a destabilizing arms race in space. This concern has become more urgent in the light of the Bush Administration’s plans for an expansive BMD system architecture featuring space-based components.

- No country can rival or contest US space dominance or the advantages it provides to US terrestrial military operations. At the end of 2001, the USA had nearly 110 operational military spacecraft, over two-thirds of all the military spacecraft orbiting the earth.

- Russia, a distant second, had about 40 operational satellites in orbit.

- The rest of the world—including Australia, China, Europe, India, Israel and commercial satellite operators—had only about 20 operational military satellites. Other states are beginning to use space-based systems to enhance their security, and commercial satellite imagery is providing new, revolutionary capabilities.

Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control

- In 2001 the USA rejected a draft protocol to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and proposed that the negotiating mandate of the ad hoc group which had drafted it be terminated.

- The USA rejected the protocol partly on the ground that it would be inadequate to deal with the growing threat of the proliferation of biological and other non-conventional weapons to 'states of concern' and terrorists. Less than a month after the 11 September terrorist attacks on the USA, letters filled with concentrated anthrax spores were mailed to members of the news media and politicians. As of August 2002, the sender of the letters remained unknown. The difficulties encountered in the criminal inquiry, the treatment of people exposed to anthrax spores and the disinfection of contaminated offices added to the US sense of vulnerability.

- The OPCW, which implements the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, faced a budgetary shortfall in 2001. The problem is a symptom of a lack of agreement on many implementation issues, which will be dealt with at the first CWC Review Conference, in 2003.

Conventional arms control

- The European model of conventional arms control measures is seen as a positive example, but it remains a low security priority elsewhere.
- In 2001 conventional arms control in Europe focused on the implementation of agreed measures, new bilateral CSBMs and the search for new approaches to the European politico-military dialogue.
- The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty is being partially implemented by the signatories, but it has not entered into force because of issues of Russian non-compliance.
- The negotiations under an annex of the 1995 Dayton Agreement concerning the regional stabilization of South-Eastern Europe were concluded and a new agreement was adopted.
- More states became parties to the APM Convention, and the second Review Conference of the 'Inhumane Weapons' Convention extended application of the convention to domestic armed conflicts.
- The UN conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons adopted a Programme of Action that illustrates, at least, the international community's political will to engage in the control of these weapons.

Multilateral weapon and technology export controls

- In response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, new ideas on the role of export controls in counter-terrorism were put forward in the Australia Group, the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

- MTCR participating states agreed the text of an International Code of Conduct aimed at discouraging ballistic missile proliferation. A decision on implementing the ICOC is expected in 2002. The NSG continued to discuss how to respond to decisions by Russia related to nuclear supply that are considered to violate the NSG guidelines.

- 41 states now participate in 1 or more of the 5 multilateral weapon and technology export regimes, and 27 states participate in all of them.

Multilateral export control regimes and number of members as of 1 January 2002

Zangger Committee	35
Nuclear Suppliers Group	39
Australia Group	33
Missile Technology Control Regime	33
Wassenaar Arrangement	33

**Arms control and disarmament agreements
and agreements on humanitarian law of
armed conflict
in force as of June 2002**

- 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)
- 1948 Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-defence among Western European states (Brussels Treaty)
- 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)
- 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
- 1954 Protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty (Paris Agreements on the Western European Union)
- 1959 Antarctic Treaty
- 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty, PTBT)
- 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

- 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
- 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT)
- 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)
- 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)
- 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty, TTBT)
- 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, PNET)
- 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (Enmod Convention)
- 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts

- 1977 Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
- 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention, or 'Inhumane Weapons' Convention)
- 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)
- 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)
- 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)
- 1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty)
- 1992 Treaty on Open Skies
- 1992 The Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement)
- 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC)

- 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)
- 1996 Agreement on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control
(Florence Agreement)
- 1997 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related
Materials
- 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
(APM Convention)
- 1999 Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures
- 2001 Concluding Document of the Negotiations
under Article V of Annex 1-B of the 1995 General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Agreements not in force as of June 2002

- 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), (in force until 13 June 2002)
- 1993 Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty)
- 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
- 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- 1999 Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions
- 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions

Acronyms

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
APM	anti-personnel mines
BMD	ballistic missile defence
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
BW	biological weapon
CCW	Certain Conventional Weapons (Convention), also called the 'Inhumane Weapons' Convention
CFE	(Treaty on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSBM	confidence- and security-building measure
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
CW	chemical weapon
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy

EU	European Union
FY	fiscal year
GDP	gross domestic product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICOC	International Code of Conduct
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PNI	Presidential Nuclear Initiative
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union

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