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## Part II

### Cutting off resources for terrorism and crime: the global and European dimensions

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### *Editors' remarks*

The chapters in this part of the volume focus on phenomena and policy challenges which, if not wholly new, have been more sharply illuminated and pushed up the priority scale by the events of 11 September 2001. Transnational terrorism has become a purveyor of mass death and destruction, and the common enemy of states, private enterprises and whole societies. Writing from a mixture of official, private-sector and analytical perspectives, the authors here group their reflections around two main questions. Do we know what terrorism is and what is the right way to fight it? Have we gone far enough, or perhaps too far, in enlisting private financial institutions and other branches of business as allies in the campaign?

The difficulty of the first question lies partly in the fact that modern-day terrorism takes many forms, while 'terror tactics' may be resorted to by an even wider range of actors. The means needed to detect and defeat a network-based, multi-target organization such as al-Qaeda are not the same as for the more familiar, territorially based and 'single-issue' breed of terrorists that the world has known for centuries. As Vadim Volkov points out, 'When states try to define this [trans-national] type of enemy in terms that reflect their own image, they are likely to fail or waste resources'. Private-sector organizations may come closer to the systemic models adopted by terrorists, and so have a better chance of understanding them: but their own long communication lines and multinational patterns of interdependence unfortunately only make them more vulnerable to attack. A second problem is that there is no single accepted international definition of terrorism or single list of terrorist organizations and persons which lends itself to all the different purposes of anti-terrorist activity. This is coming to matter more, the more the international community develops its responses in the shape of formal, often legally binding, regulations demanding the compliance of public- and private-sector entities alike.

The help of the private sector is needed precisely because modern terrorists, and the traffickers in mass destruction materials and technologies who might supply them, operate in a sub-state underworld together with drug peddlers, money launderers and criminals of other kinds. State and interstate action alone, including the coercive use of military power, has great difficulty in hitting or at least in destroying such targets. Hence the new wave of national and international measures taken since 2001 to regulate private-sector financial transfers, and tighten strategic export controls, in the hope of blocking the supply of money and materials to terrorist recipients. The logic of such approaches—to manipulate globalized processes against those who would abuse the freedoms of globalization—is impeccable, and they have already borne some fruit: although there is still some way to go (as the chapter on the European Union shows) to coordinate all relevant intra-institutional resources and extra-institutional relationships. For business, however, the consequential burdens are heavy in both material and psychological terms. As Georges Baur puts it, 'More security for the financial centre leads to more insecurity for the individual financial intermediary'. The authors stress the difficulties created when states and institutions define prohibited materials and destinations in unclear, out-of-date or inconsistent terms. They also point out the unfairness of blaming business for contributing to 'new threats' before the official world has even defined them as threats. Their plea that business should be used less as a tool, and more as an adviser and true partner, is echoed in other parts of this book.