

United Nations Arms Embargoes

Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour

Case study: Eritrea and Ethiopia, 2000–2001

Pieter D. Wezeman

sipri

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
2007

Contents

I. Introduction	2
II. Background	2
Arms transfers before the arms embargo	3
III. The arms embargo	4
Arms transfers during the arms embargo	5
IV. Lifting the arms embargo	6
Arms transfers after the arms embargo	6
V. Conclusions	7
Chronology	8
Glossary	8
Register of arms transfers	9
Table 1. Summary of suppliers of major conventional weapons to Eritrea and Ethiopia before the arms embargo	4
Table 2. Summary of suppliers of major conventional weapons to Eritrea and Ethiopia after the arms embargo	7
Table 3. Transfers prior to the UN arms embargo period, 1990–May 2000	9
Table 4. Transfers after the UN arms embargo period, May 2001–2006	11

This is one of a series of case studies on United Nations arms embargoes. Drawing on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and other open sources, these case studies analyse arms flows before, during and after a UN arms embargo has been established. These case studies were researched and written by members of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project to inform a report by SIPRI and the Uppsala University Special Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS), *United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2007). This report and the case studies are available at http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=356.

The research was carried out between November 2006 and July 2007 and was funded by a special grant from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I. Introduction

The conflict over the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia erupted in 1998 and claimed the lives of between 50 000 and 100 000 people.¹ Attempts to resolve the conflict over the disputed border via peace agreements brokered by the Organization for African Unity (OAU) only succeeded in achieving lulls in the fighting in 1999 and 2000. The United Nations imposed a voluntary arms embargo on Eritrea and Ethiopia in February 1999, followed by the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1298 on 17 May 2000. The arms embargo expired one year later, as several UNSC members concluded that the sanctions had achieved their goal with the signing of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and a formal peace agreement in December 2000.

Section II of this case study gives a brief overview of the conflict and arms transferred to Eritrea and Ethiopia before and during the voluntary arms embargo. Section III discusses the impact of the arms embargo on arms transfers. Section IV details post-embargo arms flows. The case study concludes with some general statements on impact of the voluntary and mandatory arms embargoes.

II. Background

In May 1998, five years after Eritrea had gained independence from Ethiopia, cross-border violence broke out between the two countries. The immediate cause was a dispute over their common 1000-kilometre border, which had not been fully demarcated. The two underlying causes were (a) the divergent national economic policies of two states with largely interdependent economies and (b) the personal antagonism of the presidents of the two countries.

The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia represents one of the few interstate wars fought in the past decade. It was fought by two armies consisting of an estimated 200 000 to 300 000 soldiers each. Most battles were fought along an identified front line with both sides making use of extended defensive trenches and barriers. The battles typically included large infantry assaults, accompanied by limited use of artillery, armour and air strikes.² Both countries had small numbers of relatively modern weapons, with Ethiopia's 10 Su-27 combat aircraft and Eritrea's 10 MiG-29 combat aircraft being the prime examples. These and older aircraft were used in sporadic strikes on targets deep inside each country and in air-to-air combat.³

After several bloody battles in 1998, the OAU brokered a set of basic agreements between the countries which led to a lull in the fighting for most of 1999 and early 2000. The peace process stalled when Ethiopia refused to accept more detailed agreements.

On 10 February 1999 the UNSC passed Resolution 1227, calling for an immediate halt to the hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in particular the use of air strikes.⁴ Resolution 1227 also introduced a voluntary arms embargo on the two states, as it

¹ Seybolt, T. B., 'Major armed conflicts', *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), pp. 26–30.

² Seybolt (note 1), p. 30.

³ 'Ethiopia–Eritrea hostilities', *Air Forces Monthly*, Aug. 1998, p. 10.

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1227, 10 Feb. 1999.

‘strongly urged all states to end immediately all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea’. On 15 March 1999 the European Union (EU) introduced an embargo on the export of arms and military equipment to Eritrea and Ethiopia.⁵ However, the arms embargo did not prohibit deliveries of arms and military equipment based on contracts entered into before 15 March 1999.

The voluntary UN and mandatory EU arms embargoes did not prevent the resumption of the conflict. On 12 May 2000 Ethiopia launched a surprise attack on Eritrea and within weeks had achieved several major military successes. Ethiopia was soon in a dominant military position, occupying several disputed regions and advancing into undisputed Eritrean territory. The day of the attack, the UNSC passed Resolution 1297 demanding the immediate cessation of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the reconvening of peace talks.⁶ The Security Council gave the belligerents 72 hours to begin to comply the demands contained within resolution, threatening to take immediate steps if they were not satisfied. Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and USA proposed the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo.⁷ Assessing that Eritrea and Ethiopia had failed to comply with the demands of Resolution 1297, the UNSC passed Resolution 1298 on 17 May 2000, imposing a mandatory UN arms embargo against Eritrea and Ethiopia.⁸

Arms transfers before the arms embargo

Eritrea and Ethiopia reportedly spent so much of their national income in the two years leading up to the war on arms acquisitions that the International Monetary Fund suspended its programme in Ethiopia because this military expenditure was deemed excessive relative to poverty levels in the country.⁹ Shortly after the armed conflict started in May 1998 the USA decided to suspend sales of weapons to both countries.¹⁰ In contrast, Bulgaria and Russia continued to supply weapons to both Eritrea and Ethiopia following the start of the interstate conflict. For example, in early 1999 Russian Sukhoi aircraft supplied to Ethiopia in 1998 shot down Russian MiG aircraft supplied to Eritrea in 1998.¹¹

UNSC permanent members Russia and China, as well as Bulgaria, Israel, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, choose to continue supplying weapons and military equipment to the countries despite the urging of Resolution 1227.¹² Weapons were being delivered on the eve of the mandatory arms embargo. For example, Russian-supplied Su-25 combat aircraft arrived in Ethiopia in March 2000.¹³

⁵ Council of the European Union, Common position of 15 March 1999 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning Ethiopia and Eritrea, 1999/206/CFSP, 15 Mar. 1999.

⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1297, 12 May 2000.

⁷ ‘UN warns Eritrea, Ethiopia’, *The Tribune*, 14 May 2000, <<http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000514/world.htm>>.

⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1298, 17 May 2000.

⁹ Cortright, D. and Lopez, G., *Sanctions and the Search for Security* (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Colo., 2002), p. 160

¹⁰ Bonner, R., ‘Despite cutoff by U.S., Ethiopia and Eritrea easily buy weapons’, *New York Times*, 23 July 1998.

¹¹ ‘MiGs and Sukhois in air combat over Ethiopia’, *Air Forces Monthly*, May 1999, p. 14.

¹² ‘Ukraine manufactured total of 76 Kolchuga radar systems’, Moscow Interfax, FBIS-SOV-2002-1112, 12 Nov. 2002; ‘Ukraine sold disputed arms to Ethiopia’, ITAR-TASS, FBIS-SOV-2002-0926, 26 Sept. 2002; ‘Arms flood to horn conflict’, BBC News, 16 May 2000.

¹³ *Air Forces Monthly*, June 2000, p. 18.

4 UNITED NATIONS ARMS EMBARGOES

Table 1. Summary of suppliers of major conventional weapons to Eritrea and Ethiopia before the arms embargo

Recipient	Suppliers
Eritrea	Bulgaria, China, Finland, Germany, Israel, Italy, Russia, UK
Ethiopia	Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Russia, USA, Ukraine

Arms transfers to Eritrea

Under the independence agreement concluded with Ethiopia, Eritrea obtained part of the Ethiopian armed forces in 1993.¹⁴ In the years leading up to the war, Eritrea procured a significant volume of weapons from a variety of suppliers—particularly for a poor country. However, arms procured before 1998 should be seen in the context of the tensions between Eritrea, Sudan and Yemen, not necessarily with Ethiopia.¹⁵ There is an unconfirmed report that Ethiopia gave four combat helicopters to Eritrea in 1995 in support of Eritrea's conflict with Yemen.¹⁶

The delivery of 6 to 10 MiG-29 combat aircraft from Russia in late 1998 is deemed most significant regarding preparations for conflict with Ethiopia. These aircraft were sold as a package that also included pilots and technicians.¹⁷ Little information is available regarding other deliveries. Bulgarian companies supplied rifles and light weapons in July 1998 and it seems likely that similar small arms and light weapons (SALW) supplies, possibly from other suppliers, took place during the pre- and early conflict period.¹⁸

Arms transfers to Ethiopia

After many years of considerable arms acquisitions, mainly from the Soviet Union, Ethiopian arms procurement significantly decreased after the overthrow of the military regime in 1993. Relatively small quantities of weapons were acquired, predominantly from Eastern Europe during the period 1993 to 1998. Following the start of the conflict with Eritrea, arms procurement efforts increased notably. For example, in 1998 Ethiopia imported tanks, artillery and most significantly about 10 Su-27 combat aircraft, the most advanced and powerful aircraft supplied to the Horn of Africa.

III. The arms embargo

The UNSC passed Resolution 1298 on 17 May 2000, declaring that all states shall prevent 'The sale or supply to Eritrea and Ethiopia . . . of arms and related *materiel* of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territory'.¹⁹ Resolution 1298 also prohibited 'any provision to Eritrea

¹⁴ For example six MiG-21 combat aircraft were taken over by Eritrea. *JP4*, Sept. 1994, p. 14.

¹⁵ 'Many tanks', *The Horn of Africa Bulletin*, June 1995, p. 15; Ulfkotte, U., 'NVA-Funkgeräte und Ersatzteile für Eritrea', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 Feb. 1996, p. 5.

¹⁶ 'Arms flood to Horn conflict', *BBC World Service*, 16 May 2000.

¹⁷ Gilkes, P., 'Eritrea accepts peace accord after defeat', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10 Mar. 1999, p. 43.

¹⁸ Bonner (note 10).

¹⁹ United Nations (note 8).

and Ethiopia ... of technical assistance or training related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the arms and related materiel of all types'.²⁰ The arms embargo was given an expiry date one year after its imposition, with the UNSC to decide on its renewal or allow expiration. Resolution 1298 also established a Committee consisting of all the members of the Council.²¹

Peace talks between Eritrea and Ethiopia resumed shortly after the passing of Resolution 1298 at the end of May 2000. Fighting continued on several fronts until mid-June 2000. On 18 June 2000 the Eritrean and Ethiopian presidents signed an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, which was followed by the signing of a formal peace agreement on 12 December 2000. After the armistice and formal peace agreement had been established, the USA proposed the lifting of the arms embargo at UNSC sessions in December 2000 and in January 2001. Several members of the UNSC did not support the proposal and the arms embargo remained in force.²² On 15 May 2001, the UNSC noted that the sanctions imposed on Eritrea and Ethiopia by Resolution 1298 would expire on 16 May 2001, and decided that, under the current circumstances, the sanctions would not extend the measures beyond that date.²³

Arms transfers during the arms embargo

The UN arms embargo on Eritrea and Ethiopia seems to have been abided by and enforcement appears to have been successful. For example, an existing contract between a Russian company and Ethiopia for the delivery of weapons worth up to \$200 million was put on hold and Bulgaria stopped delivery of an order for T-55 tanks after about one hundred had already been supplied.²⁴ However, it is unclear if all countries supplying weapons stopped deliveries on 17 May 2000. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin only signed a decree prohibiting the sale and delivery of weapons to Ethiopia and Eritrea in August 2000.²⁵

A few cases of possible breaches of the embargo have been reported. Resolution 1298 banned technical arms-related assistance and training, but it is unclear if the foreign pilots and technicians that accompanied the combat aircraft delivered from Russia before the arms embargo assisted Eritrea and Ethiopia during the embargo period. It was reported in late May 2000 that Russian advisers and technicians had been involved in servicing Eritrean and Ethiopian aircraft.²⁶ Another source reported at the same time that local pilots had been trained to fly the aircraft.²⁷

There has been one widely reported case of an attempt to supply arms in contravention of the arms embargo. In early May 2001 the Bulgarian authorities stopped an Ukrainian cargo aircraft containing artillery and possibly small arms from the Czech Republic from taking off from a Bulgarian airport after a refuelling stop. It appeared

²⁰ United Nations (note 8).

²¹ United Nations (note 8).

²² 'US resolution rejected', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 17 Jan. 2001, p. 6; 'Uitstel stemming VN over Eritrea', *NRC Handelsblad*, 30 Dec. 2000, <<http://www.nrc.nl>>.

²³ United Nations, 'The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia', Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Document S/PRST/2001/14, 15 May 2001.

²⁴ 'Russian expert: arms embargo against Ethiopia complicates contract implementation', Interfax, FBIS-SOV-2000-0831, 31 Aug. 2000.

²⁵ 'Russia bans Horn weapons exports', BBC News, 29 Aug. 2000.

²⁶ 'Into the hills', *The Economist*, 27 May 2000, p. 49.

²⁷ 'Arms flood to horn conflict', BBC News, 16 May 2000.

that the weapons were originally destined for Georgia, but that there was reason to suspect that either the crew or the transport company had planned to divert the weapons to a higher bidder—Eritrea.²⁸

IV. Lifting the arms embargo

The UNSC's decision to not extend the time-limited arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1298 resulted in the lifting of the UN arms embargo on Eritrea and Ethiopia on 16 May 2001. It is the only example of a time-limited arms embargo that has effectively been allowed to 'lapse' or expire. This situation arose because the UNSC accepted the Algiers Agreement of 2000 as fulfilling the demands to withdraw forces from military action and 'conclude a peaceful definitive settlement of the conflict'.²⁹ However, the arms embargo on Eritrea and Ethiopia shows that caution should be exercised in inferring short-term compliance with the demands set out in resolutions as progress towards longer-term end goals. Following Eritrean and Ethiopian respect for a June 2000 ceasefire, UN peacekeepers were deployed to monitor the border between the two countries.³⁰ Then, in October 2005, Eritrea officially protested against this UN presence, and the peacekeepers were subsequently only present on the Ethiopian side of the border.³¹ The following year Eritrean soldiers entered the Eritrea–Ethiopia buffer zone, heightening fears of renewed conflict.³² In November 2005 the UNSC reacted to the build up of forces by both sides along the border and to Eritrea restricting UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) operations, with a resolution threatening with sanctions if the two sides would not comply with the agreement of December 2000 and decreased their force levels in the border region.³³ No indication was given if an arms embargo could be included in such sanctions.

Arms transfers after the arms embargo

Shortly after the UN arms embargo on Eritrea and Ethiopia had been lifted, both states started to receive replacements for combat aircraft lost in the war but also added new aerial capabilities to their arsenals. Russia resumed deliveries of combat aircraft to Eritrea in 2001 and to Ethiopia in 2003. Ukraine supplied air-to-air missiles to Eritrea in 2002. These orders were motivated by Eritrean and Ethiopian efforts to replace combat aircraft that were lost in the interstate conflict of 2000 and also signalled that tensions remained since the underlying cause of the conflict had not been satisfactorily resolved.

²⁸ 'Georgians still waiting for delivery of Czech weapons seized in Bulgaria', *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, FBIS-EEU-2001-0516, 16 May 2001.

²⁹ United Nations, 'The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia', Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2001/14, 15 May 2001; and UN Security Council Resolution 1298 (note 8). The Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Algiers Agreement) was signed on 12 Dec. 2000 and is reproduced in UN, Identical letters dated 12 December 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Document S/2000/1183–A/55/686, 13 Dec. 2000.

³⁰ See the website of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/>>.

³¹ 'Ethiopia says will pull back troops from border', *Reuters*, 10 Dec. 2005.

³² International Crisis Group (ICG), *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War*, Africa Report no. 101 (ICG: Brussels, 22 Dec. 2005), p. i.

³³ UN Security Council Resolution 1640, 23 Nov. 2005.

It is known that Russia also delivered SALW and ammunition, including anti-tank systems and man-portable air defence systems to both Eritrea and Ethiopia in the immediate post-embargo period.³⁴ Overall, the volume of suspected deliveries has been relatively small and actual delivery dates cannot be accurately determined, making it difficult to draw any firm conclusions on the will of suppliers to support the UN sanction threats of November 2005.

Table 2. Summary of suppliers of major conventional weapons to Eritrea and Ethiopia after the arms embargo

Recipient	Suppliers
Eritrea	Russia, Ukraine
Ethiopia	Russia

V. Conclusions

The 1999 voluntary UN arms embargo on Eritrea and Ethiopia was essentially a symbolic act by the UNSC. The EU's 1999 arms embargo was undermined by the exclusion of deliveries of weapons arranged under contracts entered into before the date of entry of the arms embargo. Several countries, including UNSC permanent members, completely ignored the urging of Resolution 1227 to stop the supply of weapons to Eritrea and Ethiopia.

The mandatory UN arms embargo was introduced at too late a stage to prevent the loss of life during the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflicts of 1998–2000. Neither the threat nor the imposition of the mandatory arms embargo prevented Ethiopia from renewing its offensive against Eritrea in May 2000. It appears that Ethiopia had acquired a sufficient quantity of arms to sustain heavy and bloody fighting for several months. However, considerable numbers of weapons were destroyed on both sides during the fighting. These losses of materiel, and the fact that the mandatory arms embargo appears not to have been violated by illicit shipments of major conventional weapons, may have had an impact upon Ethiopia's decision to be satisfied with its victories in the Ethiopia–Eritrea borderlands and not try to expand upon its territorial conquests and exploit its military advantage. Unfortunately, this cannot be ascertained from the available information.

This case highlights the problem of using time-limited UN arms embargoes to influence target behaviour, in particular the fact that short-term behavioural improvements should not always be seen as signalling an irreversible resolution of the conflict. The 2000 peace agreement did not remove the causes of the conflict and the war was followed by a stalemate, with UNMEE troops positioned in between the two parties. In early 2007 Ethiopia still refused to accept the decision of an independent Boundary Commission to give control of the town of Badme to Eritrea. Tensions between the two countries over the common border therefore remain high and there are serious concerns that war may erupt again.³⁵

³⁴ Holtom, P., *Small Arms Production in Russia* (Saferworld: London, 2007), pp. 30–31.

³⁵ International Crisis Group (note 32), p. i.

Chronology

24 May 1993	Eritrea gains independence from Ethiopia
6 May 1998	Cross border violence breaks out between the two countries
May 1998	US suspends sales of weapons to both countries
10 February 1999	UNSC passes Resolution 1227, calling for an immediate halt to the hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea and a UN voluntary arms embargo
15 March 1999	EU introduces a mandatory embargo on the export of arms and military equipment to Eritrea and Ethiopia
17 May 2000	UNSC passes Resolution 1298 and imposes a mandatory arms embargo
12 May 2000	Ethiopia launches a surprise attack on Eritrea
June 2000	Eritrean and Ethiopian ceasefire
July 2000	UNSC sets up UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to maintain liaison with the parties and establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire.
September 2000	UNSC authorizes deployment within UNMEE of up to 4200 military personnel to monitor the cessation of hostilities and to help ensure the observance of security commitments.
December 2000	Algiers Agreement (Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities) and a formal peace agreement signed
16 May 2001	The UN arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1298 expires
October 2005	Eritrea officially protests against UN presence along border
November 2005	UNSC restricts UNMEE operations with a resolution threatening with sanctions if the two sides would not comply with the agreement of December 2000
October 2006	Eritrean soldiers enter the Eritrea–Ethiopia buffer zone, heightening fears of renewed conflict

Glossary

EU	European Union
OAU	Organization for African Unity
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

Register of arms transfers

This register lists major weapons on order, under delivery, or for which the license was bought and production was under way or completed during 1990–2006. ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ includes aggregates of all deliveries and licensed production since the beginning of the contract. Sources and methods for the data collection, and the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms used, are explained in SIPRI Yearbooks. Entries are alphabetical, by recipient, supplier and licensor. The register was created with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database in August 2007. This database is constantly updated and based on new information also older entries may be altered. For the latest available information on Eritrean and Ethiopian imports of major conventional weapons consult <<http://armstrade.sipri.org/>>.

Table 3. Transfers prior to the UN arms embargo period, 1990–May 2000

Recipient/ supplier (S) or licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	Comments
Eritrea							
S: Bulgaria	12	2S1 122mm	Self-propelled gun	(1999)	1999	12	Probably ex-Bulgarian
	30	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	(1999)	1999	30	Ex-Bulgarian
China	4	Y-12	Transport aircraft	1994	1994	4	
Finland	8	L-90TP Redigo	Trainer aircraft	1992	1994–95	8	
Germany (FRG)	(5)	Do-28D-2 Skyservant	Light transport ac	(1993)	1994	(5)	Ex-FRG Air Force; aid
Israel	1	Ashdod	Landing craft	1997	1997	1	Second-hand
Italy	(1)	Bell-412	Helicopter	(2000)	2000	(1)	AB-412 version
	6	MB-339C	Trainer/combat ac	1996	1997	6	\$45 m deal; MB-339CE version
Russia	(4)	Mi-24P/Mi-35P/Hind-F	Combat helicopter	(1995)	1996	(4)	Ex-Russian
	(4)	Mi-8/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	1998	1998	(4)	
	(6)	MiG-29S/Fulcrum-C	FGA aircraft	1998	1998	6	No. delivered could be up to 10; incl 2 MiG-29UB version
	(200)	Igla/SA-18 Grouse	Portable SAM	(1999)	1999	(200)	
	(36)	R-27/AA-10 Alamo	BVRAAM	1998	1998	(36)	For MiG-29 combat aircraft
	(72)	R-73/AA-11 Archer	SRAAM	1998	1998	(72)	For MiG-29 combat aircraft
UK	6	Viper	Turbojet	1996	1997	6	For 6 MB-339CE trainer aircraft from Italy; Viper-680 version

10 UNITED NATIONS ARMS EMBARGOES

Recipient/ supplier (S) or licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	Comments
Ethiopia							
S: Belarus	2	Mi-24P/Mi-35P/Hind-F	Combat helicopter	(2000)	2000	2	Ex-Belarusian
	40	T-55	Tank	(1998)	1998	40	Ex-Belarusian
Bulgaria	(50)	T-55	Tank	(1998)	1998	(50)	Ex-Bulgarian; may incl some from Ukraine and/or Romania sold via Bulgaria
	(140)	T-55	Tank	(1998)	1999-2002	(140)	Ex-Bulgarian; may incl some from Ukraine and/or Romania sold via Bulgaria; status of last 40 uncertain after delivery suspended 2000-2001 because of UN embargo
Czech Republic	(4)	L-39C Albatros	Trainer aircraft	(1997)	1997-98	(4)	
Hungary	4	Mi-8T/Hip-C	Helicopter	1997	1997	4	
Kazakhstan	100	D-30 122mm	Towed gun	(1999)	2000	100	Ex-Kazakh
	6	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	(1999)	2000	6	Ex-Kazakh
Russia	(2)	Mi-24V/Mi-35/Hind-E	Combat helicopter	1998	1999	(2)	Ex-Russian; deal worth \$150-160 m incl Su-27 fighter aircraft and Mi-8 helicopters
	(2)	Mi-8T/Hip-C	Helicopter	1998	1998	(2)	Ex-Russian; deal worth \$150-160 m incl Su-27 fighter aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters
	(4)	Su-25/Frogfoot-A	Ground attack ac	(1999)	2000	4	Ex-Russian; incl 2 Su-25UB version
	(9)	Su-27S/Flanker-B	Fighter aircraft	1998	1998-99	9	Ex-Russian; deal worth \$150-160 m incl Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters; incl 2-3 Su-27US version; for use against Eritrea; flown by Russian pilots
	(10)	2S5 155mm	Self-propelled gun	(1998)	1999	(10)	Possibly ex-Russian
	(329)	D-30 122mm	Towed gun	(1997)	1998-2000	(329)	Designation uncertain; possibly ex-Russian
	(80)	R-27/AA-10 Alamo	BVRAAM	1998	1998-99	(80)	For Su-27 combat aircraft
	(96)	R-73/AA-11 Archer	SRAAM	1998	1998-99	(96)	For Su-27 combat aircraft
USA	4	C-130B Hercules	Transport aircraft	1995	1997	(4)	Ex-US; aid
USSR	1	Natya/Type-266	Minesweeper	(1990)	1991	1	
	1	Sonya	MCM ship	(1990)	1991	1	
	1	Type-1844/Toplivo	Tanker	(1989)	1990	1	Ex-Soviet
Ukraine	4	AI-25/DV-2	Turbofan	(1997)	1997-98	(4)	For L-39C trainer aircraft from Czech Republic; Titan (AI-25TL) version produced in Czech Republic
	3	Kolchnya	Air surv system	(2000)	2000	3	

Table 4. Transfers after the UN arms embargo period, May 2001–2006

Recipient/ supplier (S) or licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	Comments
Eritrea							
S: Russia	(2)	MiG-29S/Fulcrum-C	FGA aircraft	(2001)	2001	2	
	(6)	MiG-29SMT/Fulcrum	FGA aircraft	(2002)	2005	2	
	(10)	Su-27SK/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	2003	2004–2005	(10)	Incl Su-27UB
Ukraine	80	9M133 Komet/AT-14	Anti-tank missile	2005	2005	(80)	\$0.17 m deal; Komet-E version
	5	R-27/AA-10 Alamo	BVRAAM	(2002)	2002	5	
	5	R-73/AA-11 Archer	SRAAM	(2002)	2002	5	
Ethiopia							
S: Russia	(7)	Mi-24P/Mi-35P/Hind-F	Combat helicopter	(2002)	2003	7	Deal worth \$25 m; possibly ex-Russian
	(7)	Su-27SK/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	(2002)	2003–2004	(7)	
	(18)	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	(2003)	2003	18	Possibly ex-Russian; designation uncertain