

# United Nations Arms Embargoes

## Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour

Case study: Haiti, 1993–94

Mark Bromley

**sipri**

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute  
2007

### Contents

I. Introduction	2
II. Background	2
Arms transfers before the embargo	3
III. The arms embargo	4
Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms	5
Arms transfers during the embargo	6
IV. Lifting of the embargo	7
Arms Transfers after the arms embargo	7
V. Conclusions	8
Chronology	9
Glossary	10

This is one of a series of case studies on United Nations arms embargoes. Drawing on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and other open sources, these case studies analyse arms flows before, during and after a UN arms embargo has been established. These case studies were researched and written by members of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project to inform a report by SIPRI and the Uppsala University Special Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS), *United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2007). This report and the case studies are available at <[http://books.sipri.org/product\\_info?c\\_product\\_id=356](http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=356)>.

The research was carried out between November 2006 and July 2007 and was funded by a special grant from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

## I. Introduction

In 1991 the democratically elected President of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in a coup d'état. In response, United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 841 (1993) imposed economic sanctions and an arms embargo on Haiti and demanded Aristide's return to power. The economic sanctions and arms embargo were suspended for the period August–October 1993 after the military junta signed the Governors Island Agreement, seemingly acquiescing to the demand for Aristide's return to power. In October 1993, after the UN Mission in Haiti was prevented from landing at Port au Prince, the UNSC reimposed the oil and arms embargo on Haiti via Resolution 873 (1993). This was followed in May 1994 by the expanded economic sanctions of UNSC Resolution 917 in response to the military junta's renegeing on its commitments to the Governors Island Agreement. In June 1994, the UNSC authorized a US-led military intervention, which arrived in Haiti in September 1994 unopposed. President Aristide was returned to power, and in September 1994 the UNSC adopted Resolution 944 (1994) suspending all sanctions on Haiti.

Section II gives a brief background to the coup and arms transfers in the period preceding the arms embargo. Section III considers the arms embargo's monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and suspected arms transfers to Haiti during the arms embargo. Section IV discusses the lack of arms transfers carried out after the lifting of the arms embargo. The case study concludes with some reflections on the effectiveness of the arms embargo and its impact on Aristide's eventual restoration to power.

## II. Background

In December 1990, following many decades of dictatorship, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, a radical Roman Catholic priest, was elected President of Haiti, garnering 67 per cent of the vote.<sup>1</sup> He was sworn in to office on 7 February 1991. In September 1991, after fewer than 8 months in office, Aristide was overthrown and forced into exile by a coup led by Michel François, Haiti's Chief of Police, with the support of the military and sections of Haiti's wealthy ruling class. Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras was installed as the head of the military junta that ran the country until Aristide's return to power in 1994. The coup was followed by a period of harsh repression in which thousands of people were killed or forced into exile by the military (the Forces Armées d'Haiti, FAdH) and various pro-junta paramilitary groups, including the *Police Militaire* (military police), the *Attachés*, the *Chefs de Section* (rural police chiefs) and, from 1993, a paramilitary organization called the *Front Révolutionnaire Armé pour le Progrès d'Haiti* (FRAPH) (Revolutionary Armed Front for the Progress of Haiti) led by Emmanuel 'Toto' Constant.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a more detailed overview of President Aristide ouster and subsequent return to power, see Cortright, D. and Lopez, G. A., *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s*, (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Colorado, 2000); Hull, R. E., *Imposing International Sanctions—Legal Aspects and Enforcement by the Military*, (National Defense University Press: Washington, DC, 1997); Strelau, J., *Sharpening International Sanctions: Towards a Stronger Role for the United Nations* (Carnegie Corporation: New York, 1996); and Malone, D. M., *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> Amnesty International (AI), *Haiti: Human Rights Gagged: Attacks on Freedom of Expression* (AI Index: AMR 36/25/93), Oct. 1993; and Amnesty International, *Haiti: On the Horns of a Dilemma: Military Repression or Foreign Invasion?* (AI Index: AMR 36/33/94), Aug. 1994.

In October 1991 the Organization of American States (OAS) issued a call for the immediate reinstatement of President Aristide and instituted diplomatic and economic sanctions against Haiti.<sup>3</sup> These sanctions were weakly enforced and widely ignored by non-OAS members and OAS-members alike.

Following the inauguration of US President Bill Clinton in January 1993, the Clinton administration sought the reinstatement of President Aristide.<sup>4</sup> When these efforts failed, the United States sought a UN resolution imposing sanctions on Haiti. In June 1993 Resolution 841 was adopted, outlawing all transfers of 'petroleum and petroleum related products' and 'arms and related *materiel* of all types' to Haiti.<sup>5</sup>

### Arms transfers before the embargo

Five countries supplied military equipment to Haiti between 1970 and 1985: Canada, Israel, Italy, UK, and USA, with the USA accounting for half of all transfers.<sup>6</sup> Much of the US support to Haiti during this period came in the form of military aid. For example, between 1950 and 1977 the USA provided around \$3.4 million in military aid;<sup>7</sup> Haiti also purchased military goods from the USA including \$3.2 million of crowd control equipment in 1985. US military assistance continued during the 1980s but largely came to a halt in 1987 after failed elections in Haiti. From 1989 to 1991 the only military aid Haiti received from the United States was in the form of an International Military Education Program, which provided training for Haitian military officers.

At the time of the 1991 coup, the FAdH was estimated to consist of around 6000 personnel. In addition, the FAdH had control over the police force in Port Au Prince, which was made up of around 1000 officers.<sup>8</sup> The holdings of the armed forces were limited, consisting mostly of antiquated towed artillery pieces, small numbers of armoured personnel carriers, patrol boats and light aircraft. The military had no combat aircraft or armed helicopters.<sup>9</sup> During the period of military rule, the junta was responsible for maintaining its own forces as well as for arming and funding paramilitary groups who conducted attacks on regime opponents and carried out a campaign of terror, rape, and murder against the population.<sup>10</sup>

The OAS sanctions had little impact on trade between Haiti and the outside world. According to a US General Accounting Office report from May 1992, at least a dozen countries in Europe, South America, and Africa routinely ignored the OAS sanctions, and nearly a million barrels of petroleum were imported into Haiti.<sup>11</sup> The imposition of OAS sanctions in 1991, the organization's call for these sanctions to be converted into a

<sup>3</sup> The OAS resolutions on Haiti can be found in the archives of the US State Department's *Dispatches* magazine, accessed via the United States Department of State and the Federal Depository Library at the Richard J. Daley Library, University of Illinois at Chicago (DOSFAN) Electronic Research Collection (ERC), <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/index.html>>.

<sup>4</sup> Strelau (note 1), p. 31.

<sup>5</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 841, 16 Jun. 1993. [italics in original?]

<sup>6</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <<http://armstrade.sipri.org/>>.

<sup>7</sup> Fauriol, G. A. (ed), *Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy* (Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, DC, 1995), p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> Fauriol (note 7), p. 25; and *The Military Balance 1990–1991*, (Brassey's: London, 1990), p. 197.

<sup>9</sup> *The Military Balance 1990–1991* (note 7), p. 197.

<sup>10</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 1), p. 99.

<sup>11</sup> Hull (note 1). According to Oscar Ramirez Ocampo, the first OAS special envoy to Haiti, the embargo 'has been violated systematically, evoking mockery and undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the measures'. Quoted in Werleigh, C. A., 'Haiti and the halfhearted', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Nov. 1993, p. 22.

UN resolution, statements from the exiled President Aristide, and resolutions from the UN General Assembly which also called for UN sanctions, including an arms embargo,<sup>12</sup> would have given the military junta fair warning of the possible imposition of a UN arms embargo. In addition, following the OAS sanctions, the USA issued a national embargo on the transfer of arms to Haiti and terminated all military and financial assistance.<sup>13</sup> Given the USA's role as Haiti's main arms supplier, this measure might have forced the Haitian military to look for alternative sources for military equipment. Nonetheless, there is no concrete evidence that any arms transfers to Haiti occurred during the period between the October 1991 imposition of the OAS and USA embargoes and the UN arms embargo imposed in June 1993. One source has suggested that the junta used the period of the OAS sanctions to stock up on munitions—purchasing new tanks, weapons, ammunition, and military uniforms.<sup>14</sup> However, no information is given on the origin of this equipment, the precise dates of the transfers, or the exact equipment involved. Additionally, these reports are not verified elsewhere, making it hard to know if any transfers actually took place. In particular, it is difficult to believe that transfers of tanks to Haiti could occur without being reported in more than one place.

### III. The arms embargo

In June 1993 the UNSC passed Resolution 841, outlawing all transfers of 'petroleum and petroleum related products' and 'arms and related *materiel* of all types' to Haiti. The resolution stated that the UNSC was responding to concerns raised by the OAS, declared the crisis in Haiti 'a threat to international peace and security', and indicated that the sanctions would remain in place until the *de facto* authorities in Haiti had 'signed and . . . begun implementing in good faith an agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide'.<sup>15</sup>

Following the imposition of UN sanctions, the military junta agreed to negotiations with Aristide. This led to the 'Governors Island Agreement' of July 1993 which called for the return of Aristide to Haiti; the appointment of new prime minister to be nominated by Aristide; an amnesty for those involved in supporting the military junta; the suspension of all UN and OAS sanctions; and the establishment of a UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). In August 1993, following the appointment of Aristide's designated prime minister, all UN sanctions on Haiti were suspended. However, the military junta subsequently reneged on the Governors Island Agreement before Aristide could return to Haiti. In October 1993, in the most dramatic signal of the military junta's defiance, an armed gang prevented the first deployment of UNMIH from landing at Port au Prince. Three days later, Resolution 873 reinstated the fuel and arms embargo on Haiti.<sup>16</sup>

In May 1994, in the face of continuing intransigence from the military junta, the UNSC adopted Resolution 917, which significantly expanded the sanctions regime. The resolution imposed a blanket ban on imports and exports to and from Haiti excluding

<sup>12</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/47/20, 22 Mar. 1993.

<sup>13</sup> Hull (note 1).

<sup>14</sup> Werleigh (note 11), p. 23.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations (note 5).

<sup>16</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 873, 13 Oct. 1993.

certain humanitarian goods. In addition, it outlawed all non-scheduled commercial flights to and from Haiti and imposed targeted sanctions against members of the military junta, the armed forces, the police, and their families.<sup>17</sup> The resolution stated that these sanctions would remain in place until the military junta stepped down and President Aristide returned to Haiti.

In July 1994 the military junta expelled all UN and human rights monitors from Haiti, directly leading to a UN resolution authorizing a US-led military intervention to forcefully restore Aristide to power.<sup>18</sup> The US Government's willingness to use military force to resolve the crisis was largely motivated by growing criticism of the sanctions regime and the ongoing problem of Haitian refugees fleeing to the USA.<sup>19</sup> A last-minute mediation effort averted a forceful invasion and in September 1994 a US force of 20 000 troops landed in Haiti unopposed. President Aristide returned shortly afterwards. In late October 1994, the UNSC adopted Resolution 948 lifting all existing sanctions on Haiti.<sup>20</sup>

### **Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms**

The first arms embargo, Resolution 841, created a sanctions committee to monitor the implementation of the embargo and to report on any alleged violations. Greater efforts were made to police the second UN embargo, Resolution 873—including the imposition of a naval blockade as mandated by Resolution 875 and more concerted attempts to convince the Dominican Republic to police its border with Haiti more effectively.<sup>21</sup> By late October, the embargo was being policed by six US and three Canadian warships,<sup>22</sup> which were later joined by three additional ships, one each from Argentina, France and the Netherlands.<sup>23</sup> While the naval blockade did have an impact upon the amount of shipping to and from Haiti, it also suffered a number of notable failures. The most high-profile of these came in May 1994 when a Bahamian vessel managed to avoid the blockade and dock in Haiti.<sup>24</sup> The biggest weakness of the naval blockade was its inability to tackle the biggest source of illicit trade during the embargo period—the flow of goods across the border with the Dominican Republic.

The President of the Dominican Republic, Joaquin Balaguer, was reported to have ties with Haiti's military and business elite and never supported the imposition of the embargo.<sup>25</sup> Little or no effort was made to police the border effectively and there were repeated accusations that government officials were profiting from the illegal trafficking of goods to Haiti, particularly oil.<sup>26</sup> After May 1994 the Dominican Republic, under

<sup>17</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 917, 6 May 1994.

<sup>18</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 940, 31 Jul. 1994.

<sup>19</sup> By late 1993 there were frequent news reports regarding the impact that UN sanctions were having on the Haitian population. In November 1993 a controversial study from Harvard University concluded that the embargo may have been responsible for up to 1000 extra child deaths per month, while having little impact on the military junta. French, H. W., 'Study says Haiti sanctions kill up to 1,000 children a month', *New York Times*, 9 Nov. 1993, p. A1.

<sup>20</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 948, 15 Oct. 1994.

<sup>21</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 875, 13 Oct. 1993.

<sup>22</sup> 'Haiti: American and Canadian ships monitor the naval blockade', *Atlantic News*, No. 2563, 20 Oct. 1993.

<sup>23</sup> Malone (note 1), p. 93.

<sup>24</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 1), p. 100.

<sup>25</sup> Hull (note 1).

<sup>26</sup> Cockburn, P., 'Sanctions drive brings Haiti to the edge of ruin', *The Independent (UK)*, 18 Feb. 1994, p. 14. In May 1994, the smuggling of oil across the border was reported to be pervasive, despite the reimposed UN embargo

strong international pressure, began to take greater efforts towards policing the border.<sup>27</sup> 10 000 Dominican troops were deployed along the border, and the government gave the UN permission to provide technical support on policing the embargo.<sup>28</sup> In late July, the United States obtained permission from the Dominican government to patrol the Dominican side of the border.<sup>29</sup> Deployment of this force was delayed and had still not arrived by the time of the US-led intervention in Haiti in mid-September 1994.<sup>30</sup>

### **Arms transfers during the embargo**

There is a general consensus that there were no unauthorized arms transfers to Haiti during each of the two UN arms embargo periods.<sup>31</sup> Violations of neither the arms embargo nor travel restrictions were considered by the UN committee monitoring the sanctions and there are no verifiable reports of arms being transferred to Haiti in the international media even during the period during which sanctions were suspended August–October 1993.<sup>32</sup> According to one assessment, the arms embargo was so successful that materiel shortages during the embargo period led to the virtual collapse of the FAdH. A force of 6000 shrank to just 1000 deployable troops by the time of the US intervention in 1994.<sup>33</sup>

However, although there are no reports of breaches of the arms embargo, there are also no reports of any attempted breaches being halted. Small arms and related ammunition would have been relatively easy to smuggle across the poorly policed border with the Dominican Republic. As noted, almost until the arrival of US forces in Haiti, large numbers of vehicles were crossing the Dominican border with little or no hindrance. In addition, the Haitian arms embargo was one of the first to include related enforcement and policing mechanisms. The investigators on the sanctions committee may therefore have lacked the knowledge and skills necessary to uncover breaches. Lastly, the attention of the international media was mainly focussed on violations of the oil embargo and the impact of the sanctions regime upon Haitian civilians. The lack of reporting on violations of the arms embargo may have been a product of this focus. Meanwhile, the apparent success of the arms embargo may have been more a reflection of the minimal needs and/or resources of the Haitian military and paramilitary forces during the embargo period, than the effectiveness of the embargo monitoring system. The apparent collapse of the FAdH may have more to do with financial problems than the arms embargo, while the FRAPH and Attaché forces engaged in suppressing opposition to the military junta were equipped with small arms and that could have been supplied relatively easily with existing military and government stocks.

being in place for over 6 months. See French, H.W., 'Haiti military braces for total embargo', *International Herald Tribune*, 24 May 1994, p. 3.

<sup>27</sup> Hull (note 1).

<sup>28</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 1), p. 101.

<sup>29</sup> Hull (note 1).

<sup>30</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 1), p. 101.

<sup>31</sup> See Knight, W. A., *The United Nations and Arms Embargo Verification* (The Edwin Mellen Press: Lewiston, New York, 1998); Stephanides, J., 'The experience of the United Nations in administering arms embargoes and travel sanctions', First Expert Seminar on Smart Sanctions, Nov. 1999, <<http://www.bicc.de/events/unsanc/1999/papers.php>>; and Mendiburu, M. and Meek, S., *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti* (UNIDIR: Geneva, 1996), p. 32.

<sup>32</sup> Stephanides (note 31).

<sup>33</sup> Fauriol (note 7), p. 25.

One possible violation of the arms embargo relates to allegations surrounding US-support for the FRAPH paramilitary group, formed in 1993 and responsible for murdering and attacking large numbers of Aristide supporters.<sup>34</sup> It has been alleged that the FRAPH-head, Emmanuel ‘Toto’ Constant, was a paid CIA asset and formed the group at the instigation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as part of a wider US-policy that aimed to return Aristide to power and simultaneously undermine aspects of his populist program.<sup>35</sup> Constant later publicly avowed these claims in a televised interview. Beginning in July 1993, large-scale arms shipments from Miami were crucial to the formation of the FRAPH. These shipments included Colt .38 revolvers, 9-millimeter semi-automatic pistols, M-3 machine guns, Thompson submachine guns, Smith & Wesson .38 revolvers and fragmentation and gas grenades. In total, 5000 to 10 000 pieces arrived from Florida while a separate stream, roughly as large, was delivered from Brazil.<sup>36</sup> The exact role allegedly played by US-government agencies in these arms shipments has not been elaborated upon. The allegations are based upon the testimony of a Haitian army officer who helped arrange the deals, who stated that US authorities did not appear to take steps to prevent the transfers, but did not discuss the active participation of US government officials in the trafficking. Constant stated that the FRAPH never imported arms from the USA with CIA acquiescence but that another paramilitary group, the Attachés, did.<sup>37</sup>

Establishing whether these transfers took place, and what role the USA played in them, is beyond the scope of this study. US officials have stated that Constant was little more than a paid informant and neither the CIA nor DIA played any role in the formation of the FRAPH, while others claim that he was an important asset, pointing to the fact that he was allowed to live freely in the USA following Aristide’s return power.<sup>38</sup> As one report puts it, ‘Rumour and anecdote substitute for fact when it comes to assessing the trade, distribution, and origins of small arms in Haiti’.<sup>39</sup>

#### IV. Lifting of the embargo

Following President Aristide’s return to power in September 1994, the UNSC adopted Resolution 944 suspending all existing sanctions on Haiti, which was shortly followed by Resolution 948 in October 1994 lifting all sanctions.<sup>40</sup>

#### **Arms Transfers after the arms embargo**

One of President Aristide’s first acts upon returning to power was to reduce the size and influence of the Haitian Armed Forces, further reducing their need for arms imports. In January 1995 President Aristide dismissed 43 senior officers and others were sent to diplomatic posts abroad while large numbers of troops left their posts.<sup>41</sup> By 1996, the

<sup>34</sup> Crann, D., ‘Giving “the devil” his due’, *The Nation*, Jun. 2001, pp. 54–75.

<sup>35</sup> Nairn, A., ‘Occupation Haiti: the eagle is landing’, *The Nation*, 3 Oct. 1994, pp. 344–348.

<sup>36</sup> Nairn, A., ‘Haiti under the gun’, *The Nation*, Jan. 1996, pp. 11–15.

<sup>37</sup> Nairn (note 36).

<sup>38</sup> Crann (note 34), pp. 54–75.

<sup>39</sup> Muggah, R., *Securing Haiti’s Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration*, (Small Arms Survey: Occasional Paper 14, Oct. 2005).

<sup>40</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 944, 29 Sept. 1994; and UN Security Council Resolution 948, 15 Oct. 1994.

<sup>41</sup> Mendiburu and Meek (note 31), p. 23.

size of the Haitian armed forces had shrunk to an estimated 1500 troops with virtually no officer corps. There are no records of any transfers of major conventional weapons to Haiti in the years following President Aristide's return to power in 1994.<sup>42</sup>

## V. Conclusions

There is considerable disagreement concerning the role that UN sanctions played in paving the way for Aristide's return to power. However, one apparent point of agreement is that the arms embargo component of the sanctions regime had little or no impact on the junta's decisions.

The first set of UN sanctions seems to have played a role in convincing the military junta to engage in negotiations and allow for Aristide's return to power. On 21 June 1993, just five days after the approval of Resolution 841, Raoul Cedras agreed to meet UN representative Dante Caputo, dropping his previous insistence that OAS sanctions had to be lifted before talks could take place.<sup>43</sup> These negotiations led to the Governors Island Agreement in July, under which the military agreed to give up power and allow Aristide's return to power. The subsequent failure to achieve these goals has been variously attributed to flaws in the Governor's Island Agreement, particularly the decision to lift sanctions before the military regime had fulfilled its obligations, and attempts by both Cedras and Aristide to undermine the accord.<sup>44</sup> However, this should not detract from the crucial role that sanctions played in helping to establish a 'bargaining framework' and 'initiating a diplomatic process for resolving the conflict', bringing the regime leaders to the negotiating table.<sup>45</sup>

The role of the second set of UN sanctions is more contentious, with observers divided on its role in forcing the military junta from power. According to one view, it was only the imminent threat of a US-led invasion that convinced the regime to cede power and a continuation of sanctions would only have brought further hardship on the Haitian people.<sup>46</sup> This view is supported by various news reports at the time, detailing how the junta and its allies used the shortages created by the sanctions to increase their hold on power and enrich themselves financially.<sup>47</sup> President Clinton in his address to the nation following the signing of the Carter-Cedras agreement, which led to the peaceful deployment of US troops lent further support to this view. Clinton stated that it was clear 'that this agreement only came because of the credible and imminent threat of the multinational force'.<sup>48</sup>

Other observers argue that after the expansion of the sanctions regime in May 1994 and the subsequent efforts to police the Haitian border with the Dominican Republic more effectively there were growing signs that the Haitian regime's resolve was faltering and that it was willing to negotiate.<sup>49</sup> According to this view, the improved sanctions regime may have eventually led to Aristide's return if they had been given

<sup>42</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 6).

<sup>43</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 1), p. 92.

<sup>44</sup> Lawrence P., 'The challenges of the negotiating process', ed Fauriol (note 7), p. 102.

<sup>45</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 1), p. 92.

<sup>46</sup> Hull (note 1).

<sup>47</sup> French (note 26).

<sup>48</sup> Hull (note 1).

<sup>49</sup> Brooks, R. A., 'Sanctions and regime type: what works, and when?', *Security Studies*, vol. 11, no. 4 (2002), pp. 1-50, p. 44.

more time. A third view holds that sanctions formed part of a wider set of threats and incentives—the threat of invasion, safe passage into exile for Haiti’s military rulers, and the US agreeing to pay rent on properties left behind—all of which played a role in facilitating the peaceful restoration of democracy.<sup>50</sup>

By the time the Haitian military agreed to cede power it was under comprehensive economic sanctions covering almost all imports and exports, international flights to and from Haiti had been suspended, the foreign assets of the regime leaders had been frozen, and the country was under imminent threat of a US-led invasion. It seems fair to assert that, in such circumstances, the existence of an arms embargo had a limited impact on the junta’s decision-making process.

## Chronology

Dates directly related to UNSC arms embargo decisions are highlighted in bold

16 December 1990	Father Jean Bertrand Aristide is elected President of Haiti
7 February 1991	President Aristide is sworn into office
30 September 1991	President Aristide is overthrown and forced into exile in a coup instigated by Michel François, Haiti’s Chief of Police, with the backing of the military and the wealthy ruling class
8 October 1991	The OAS calls for a hemispheric trade embargo and asset freezes against Haiti until democracy is restored
9 October 1991	US imposes arms embargo on Haiti
<b>16 June 1993</b>	UNSC Resolution 841 imposes an arms and oil embargo, froze foreign assets, and set up a Security Council sanctions committee
23 June 1993	The UN embargo takes effect
3 July 1993	Ousted President Aristide and military leader Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras agree at Governors Island New York to a UN plan for Aristide to return in October and for Cedras to step down.
<b>27 August 1993</b>	UNSC Resolution 861 suspends the UN sanctions
11 October 1993	The first deployment of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) is prevented from landing at Port au Prince
<b>13 October 1993</b>	UNSC Resolution 873 reimposes the oil and arms embargo on Haiti
<b>16 October 1993</b>	UNSC Resolution 875 calls on member states to enforce the fuel and arms embargo with a naval blockade
6 May 1994	UNSC Resolution 917 expanded the embargo to include all commodities and products, with the exception of medical supplies and foodstuffs. The embargo also includes a flight ban and a freeze on the assets of the military junta, their supporters and families
13 July 1994	UN human rights monitors are forced to leave Haiti by the military junta
31 July 1994	UNSC Resolution 940 authorizes a multinational military force to restore President Aristide to power

<sup>50</sup> Stremlau (note 1), p. 32.

## 10 UNITED NATIONS ARMS EMBARGOES

- 18 September 1994 Carter-Cedras agreement announced following negotiations between President Clinton's emissaries and the Haitian military junta allowing for the peaceful deployment of US troops
- 19 September 1994 A US force of 20 000 troops lands in Haiti unopposed
- 29 September 1994** UNSC Resolution 944 suspends all UN sanctions and the UN Sanctions Committee
- 15 October 1994** UNSC Resolution 948 terminates all UN sanctions and the UN Sanctions Committee

## Glossary

DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FAdH	Forces Armées d'Haiti
FRAPH	Front Révolutionnaire Armé pour le Progrès d'Haïti
OAS	Organization of American States
UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti
UNSC	United Nation Security Council