

# United Nations Arms Embargoes

## Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour

### Case study: Former Yugoslavia, 1991–96

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This is one of a series of case studies on United Nations arms embargoes. Drawing on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and other open sources, these case studies analyse arms flows before, during and after a UN arms embargo has been established. These case studies were researched and written by members of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project to inform a report by SIPRI and the Uppsala University Special Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS), *United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2007). This report and the case studies are available at <[http://books.sipri.org/product\\_info?c\\_product\\_id=356](http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=356)>.

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## I. Introduction

The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991 was accompanied by three separate but interlinked conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In response, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed an arms embargo on the SFRY and its successor states which lasted from September 1991 until it was lifted in June 1996 following the signing of the Dayton Agreement.

Section II of this case study gives a brief background to these three conflicts and discusses the transfer of arms to the various parties before the imposition of the UN arms embargo. Section III discusses the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and known and suspected arms transfers during the embargo. Section IV discusses arms transfers in the period immediately after the lifting of the embargo. It concludes with some reflections on the effectiveness of the embargo and its impact on the dynamics of the conflict.

## II. Background

The SFRY was a federation consisting of six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina), and multiple nationalities, including Croats, Macedonian Slavs, Montenegrins, Serbs, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims (or Bosniaks), Albanians, Turks and Romany. The populations of each republic were ethnically mixed, with significant ethnic minorities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1991, Serbs constituted 12 per cent of the population of Croatia, while the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 44 per cent Bosniak, 31 per cent Serb and 17 per cent Croat.<sup>1</sup>

The long-term causes of the Yugoslav wars are too complex to discuss here.<sup>2</sup> In the short term they were caused by two interlinked factors. First, attempts by Slovenia, Croatia and, later, Bosnia and Herzegovina to secede from the SFRY and corresponding efforts by Serbia to halt that process. Second, attempts by externally supported ethnic minorities within the breakaway republics to secede from the new states. These processes resulted in three separate but interlinked wars. First, the brief war over Slovenia's secession, involving limited clashes between Slovenian and Yugoslav National Army (YNA) forces. Second, the more drawn out war over Croatia's secession, which involved Croatian and YNA forces, along with Croatian Serb armed groups. Third, the more complex war over the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, involving, at different times, YNA, Bosnian<sup>3</sup> and Croatian forces, along with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat armed groups.<sup>4</sup> The wars were the most violent conflicts on European soil since the end of World War II. They were marked by widespread human

<sup>1</sup> Lukic, R. and Lynch, A., *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (Oxford, University Press: Oxford, 1996), p. 200.

<sup>2</sup> For background information on the Yugoslav wars, see Malcolm, N., *Bosnia: A Short History* (Macmillan: London, 1994); Woodward, S. L., *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (The Brookings Institute: Washington, DC, 1995); Glenny, M., *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (Penguin: London, 1996); Lukic and Lynch (note 1); and Silber, L. and Little, A., *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (Penguin Books: New York, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> The term 'Bosnian forces' is used here to refer to forces loyal to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Bosniaks constituted the majority of these forces, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs also fought alongside them.

<sup>4</sup> These 3 wars, along with the Kosovo war in 1999, are often termed the Wars of Yugoslav succession. The Kosovo conflict and its accompanying arms embargo are dealt with in a separate case study in this series.

rights abuses and war crimes, including the targeting of civilian populations and ethnic cleansing.

The SFRY's first multiparty elections in May 1990 brought pro-independence parties to power in both Croatia and Slovenia. Following inconclusive talks on maintaining the federation, both Croatia and Slovenia declared independence on 25 June 1991. The next day a column of YNA tanks entered Slovenia. In the face of well-planned Slovenian resistance, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic withdrew YNA forces after only 10 days of fighting and the deaths of fewer than 50 combatants.<sup>5</sup>

Tensions in Croatia had been rising since the 1990 elections, with Croatian Serbs in the Serb-dominated region of Krajina agitating for independence from Croatia and, later, union with the remnants of the SFRY. Following Croatia's declaration of independence in 1991, heavy fighting broke out between the Croatian authorities on one side, and Croatian Serb forces and the YNA on the other. By August, the conflict had escalated to the point of full-scale war, pitting Croatian forces—seeking to establish control of their newly declared independent state—against the Croatian Serb minority, which was backed by the YNA and fighting to remain part a Serb-dominated rump SFRY. The war was marked by widespread brutality and human rights abuses, including the frequent bombardment of civilian targets—for example the YNA sieges of Dubrovnik and Vukovar.

Bosnia and Herzegovina held its first multiparty elections in November 1990 with the majority of votes split between nationalist parties representing each of the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats. After a brief period of power-sharing, the three parties fell out over the future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In September 1991 the Bosnian Serb leadership asked the SFRY to provide protection for their community and YNA troops quickly established the 'borders' of the 'Serb Autonomous Region of Herzegovina'. Bosnian Croats, with the support of the Croatian Government, formed their own breakaway territory. In October 1991 the Bosnian Serb leadership quit the Bosnian assembly in Sarajevo, which then voted for independence.

In September 1991, the UNSC adopted Resolution 713 imposing an arms embargo on the SFRY.<sup>6</sup> In January 1992 the UNSC, via Resolution 727, explicitly extended the coverage of the arms embargo to the SFRY's successor states.<sup>7</sup>

### **Arms transfers before the embargo**

Prior to the Yugoslav wars, the YNA was one of the best equipped military forces in Europe. The YNA had 195 000 soldiers on active duty armed with a sophisticated arsenal including modern fighter jets, helicopters, armoured vehicles and artillery units—all under the central control of the federal government in Belgrade. In addition, under the SFRY's 'Total People's Defence' doctrine, each republic had its own Territorial Defence Force (TDF) which had a combined force of 510 000 reservists. These two forces had an estimated stockpile of 2.3 million rifles. In the case of the

<sup>5</sup> Lukic and Lynch (note 1), p. 184.

<sup>6</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 713, 25 Sep. 1991. For more information on the arms embargo on Yugoslavia, see Cortright, D. and Lopez, G. A., *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Colo., 2000); and Strelau, J., *Sharpening International Sanctions: Towards a Stronger Role for the United Nations* (Carnegie Corporation: New York, 1996).

<sup>7</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 727, 8 Jan. 1992.

TDFs, much of this arsenal was stored at decentralized depots throughout the different republics, including schools and other municipal buildings.<sup>8</sup> However, the YNA retained the monopoly on major weapons. These consisted of nearly 2000 main battle tanks, about 1400 armoured vehicles, over 4000 artillery pieces, 150 fighter aircraft and over 200 helicopters.<sup>9</sup>

The SFRY also had a capable arms industry that produced most of the equipment procured by the YNA, while also exporting significant numbers of small arms, tanks, aircraft and other military equipment. According to local estimates, about 90 per cent of the arms produced in the SFRY were based on domestic research and development activities, while 10 per cent were based on foreign licences or required foreign technology input.<sup>10</sup> Geographically, the defence industry was extremely decentralised, although the majority of the most important facilities were located in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—with about 60 per cent of all production sites were located in Serbia.<sup>11</sup>

The period preceding the imposition of the UN arms embargo was marked by intense efforts by all parties to secure as great a part of the SFRY's stockpiles of arms and ammunition and its arms industry infrastructure as possible. The period was also marked by efforts on the part of the three independence-seeking republics—Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the various armed factions within those republics—to import arms via clandestine networks, often with the assistance or acquiescence of sections of supplier governments. It seems unlikely that this behaviour was in any way influenced by the threat of a UN arms embargo.

**Table 1.** Summary of possible/suspected sources and secondary support for arms transfers to the former Yugoslavia before the arms embargo

Recipient	Source of arms	Secondary support	Non-state actors
Bosnian forces	Slovenia	..	Brokers
Bosnian Serb forces	SFRY	..	..
Croatia	GDR, Lebanon	Hungary	Brokers
Croatian Serb forces	SFRY	..	..
Slovenia	Hungary, Singapore	..	..
SFRY	..	..	..

### *Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The Bosnian Government created a National Defence Council in June 1991 and purchased arms from Slovenia in the autumn.<sup>12</sup> By July 1991 there was growing evidence that the Bosnian Serb forces were receiving regular arms shipments from the

<sup>8</sup> 'Armed and dangerous: the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Balkans', *BICC Conversion Survey 2002* (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: Baden Baden, 2002), pp. 126–145.

<sup>9</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990–1991* (Brassey's: London, 1990).

<sup>10</sup> Wulf, H., 'Annexe A, Yugoslavia: arms production before the war', ed. H. Wulf, *Arms Industry Limited* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), pp. 387–391.

<sup>11</sup> Wulf (note 10), pp. 387–391.

<sup>12</sup> Woodward (note 2), p. 253. Other reports state that Bosnia was already purchasing arms in early 1991. *Srebrenica—A 'Safe' Area: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences and Analyses of the Fall of a Safe Area*, Appendix II: Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992–1995: the role of the intelligence and security services, 'Secret arms supplies and other covert actions', Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), 10 Apr. 2002, <<http://193.173.80.81/srebrenica/>>.

YNA. These shipments were arranged by Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Kradic.<sup>13</sup>

### *Croatia and Slovenia*

In October 1990 the YNA moved to take control of all TDF and YNA assets in Croatia and Slovenia. However, Croatia succeeded in capturing some 230 tanks, more than 400 heavy artillery pieces, about 2000 SA-7 missiles, 38 000 small arms and 20 million rounds of ammunition.<sup>14</sup> Croatian forces also seized around 30 ships and all of the bases of the former Yugoslav navy.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, pre-emptive action on the part of the Slovene leadership ensured the capture of around 60 per cent of YNA stocks based in Slovenia.<sup>16</sup>

Croatia and Slovenia began purchasing arms abroad during the autumn of 1990. For the most part, these arms were sourced from former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries and taken from the large stockpiles of weaponry earmarked for decommissioning under the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.<sup>17</sup> For example, in 1990 Croatia imported up to 30 000 Kalashnikov rifles from Hungary.<sup>18</sup> Croatia also sought to purchase arms further afield. In August 1991 four Croatians were arrested in the United States trying to purchase \$12 million worth of rifles and surface-to-air missiles.<sup>19</sup> Croatian Serb armed groups began appearing after the August 1990 independence referendum. These groups obtained weaponry through raids on police stations and army stockpiles, but they are also known to have received rifles and armoured vehicles from the YNA.<sup>20</sup> Slovenia is believed to have acquired AMD-65 rifles from Hungary and German designed Armbrust anti-tank missiles, possibly from Singapore.<sup>21</sup>

### III. The arms embargo

In July 1991, both the USA and the European Community (EC) imposed arms embargoes on the SFRY.<sup>22</sup> In September 1991, as fighting between Serbia and Croatia intensified, the UNSC passed Resolution 713 (1991) imposing an arms embargo on the SFRY. The resolution was tabled at the request of France and Austria and had broad support, particularly among non-aligned states.<sup>23</sup> The UN arms embargo was also welcomed by the Serbian SFRY representative at the UN, an early sign of the asymmetric impact it would have on the different parties to the conflict. Reports

<sup>13</sup> Confirmation of these transfers came in Aug. 1991, when outgoing federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic released a tape recording of a telephone conversation in which Milosevic could be heard informing Karadzic that his next delivery of arms would be supplied to him by General Nikola Uzelac, the federal army commander in Banja Luka. Malcolm (note 2), p. 225.

<sup>14</sup> Vego, M., 'The Croatian Army', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 1993, p. 206.

<sup>15</sup> Woodward (note 2), p. 263.

<sup>16</sup> Woodward (note 2), p. 137.

<sup>17</sup> Gow, J., 'Arms Sales and Embargoes: The Yugoslav Example', *Bulletin of Arms Control*, no. 3, Aug. 1991, pp. 2-7.

<sup>18</sup> 'Hungarian daily "Nespsabadsag" exposes arms sales to Croatia', *Eastern European Report*, 23-29 Jul. 1995, p. 15.

<sup>19</sup> 'Fanning the flames of conflict: the republics bid for arms', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 24 Aug. 1991, p. 311.

<sup>20</sup> Vego, M., 'The Army of Serbian Krajina', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Oct. 1993, p. 439.

<sup>21</sup> Beaver, P., 'Slovene force's imported arms', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 13 July 1991, p. 49.

<sup>22</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 6), p. 65.

<sup>23</sup> Stremlau (note 6), p. 26.

indicate that without the SFRY's support for the arms embargo, China would have vetoed the resolution.<sup>24</sup> In January 1992 the UNSC extended the coverage of the arms embargo to include the SFRY's successor states with Resolution 727.<sup>25</sup>

In November 1991, Cyrus Vance was named special envoy of the UNSC to try to resolve the conflict. In January 1992 he managed to negotiate a UN-backed lasting ceasefire.<sup>26</sup> In March 1992 a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed in Croatia, creating a number of UN protected areas (UNPAs) and YNA troops were withdrawn. At this time Croatian Serb forces controlled approximately one-third of Croatia. UNPROFOR was able to maintain an uneasy peace for three years before Croatia forcibly retook the majority of Croatian Serb-controlled territory in a series of offensives in May and September 1995 forcing the withdrawal of UN forces. During and after these offensives, some 200 000 Croatian Serbs, including all Croatian Serb forces, fled Croatia.<sup>27</sup>

The 1992 ceasefire in Croatia and the international recognition granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina in April paved the way for a brutal war between Bosnian, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb forces, with the latter two receiving arms and support from Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) respectively.<sup>28</sup> As in Croatia, the conflict was marked by its brutality and the frequent targeting of civilians. Numerous massacres also took place—most notoriously in Srebrenica in July 1995, when an estimated 8000 Bosniak males were killed by Bosnian Serb forces. In the aftermath of the conflict, Bosnian sources claimed that that over 200 000 people died in the conflict. More recent research has put the death toll at around 100 000.<sup>29</sup>

In March and April 1992, YNA troops, along with Serbian and Bosnian Serb armed groups, launched a series of attacks capturing large amounts of territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>30</sup> Although the withdrawal of YNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced in April 1992, armed groups from the FRY continued to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian Serb paramilitaries continued to receive financing and materiel support from the FRY.<sup>31</sup> By the summer of 1992 Bosnian Serb forces controlled 70 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina and had laid siege to the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo.

As the conflict wore on, maintaining the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina came to be seen as increasingly controversial, with many arguing that it violated Bosnia's 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' under Article 51 of the UN Charter.<sup>32</sup> In December 1992, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) requested that the UNSC lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina

<sup>24</sup> Chesterman, J., *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention in International Law* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), p. 133.

<sup>25</sup> United Nations (note 7).

<sup>26</sup> Strelau (note 6), p. 26.

<sup>27</sup> Amnesty International Public Statement, 'Croatia: Operation "Storm"—still no justice ten years on', 4 Aug. 2005, <<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engneur640022005>>.

<sup>28</sup> In April 1992 Milosevic announced the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a federation on the territory of the two remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

<sup>29</sup> 'Bosnian war death toll is 100,000', The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, 22 Nov. 2005, <<http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=12507>>.

<sup>30</sup> Malcolm (note 2), p. 238.

<sup>31</sup> Malcolm (note 2), p. 239.

<sup>32</sup> 'Legal Dilemmas of Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia', *IISS Strategic Comments*, 4 May 1995.

and authorize the use of force against the FRY.<sup>33</sup> This was followed by a UN General Assembly resolution calling upon the UNSC ‘to exempt the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo’.<sup>34</sup> The issue was also hotly debated in the USA. The US Congress repeatedly called for the removal of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina and even allocated funds for arms shipments, though they were never used.<sup>35</sup> In June 1993 the US administration tabled a draft UNSC resolution calling for the removal of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>36</sup> These moves were consistently blocked by Russia and several European states. Partly motivated by a desire to protect their deployed peacekeepers from possible retaliation by Bosnian Serb forces, France and the UK, in particular, argued that lifting the arms embargo would lead to an escalation of the conflict. As British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd put it, lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government would not level the playing field but ‘level the killing field’.<sup>37</sup>

In May 1992, by a vote of 13–0 (with China and Zimbabwe abstaining), the UNSC passed Resolution 757, imposing a complete economic embargo on the FRY.<sup>38</sup> The resolution, among other things, imposed an economic blockade against the FRY, broke all scientific, cultural, and sports ties, and cut diplomatic ties to Belgrade.<sup>39</sup> The sanctions were intended to convince Milosevic to curtail support for the Bosnian Serbs, thereby making the Bosnian Serb leadership more willing to negotiate an end to the conflict. As the conflict worsened and the FRY continued to support and supply Bosnian Serb forces, the UNSC took steps to strengthen the economic sanctions passing Resolution 787 prohibiting the transshipment through the FRY of certain designated strategic goods—and Resolution 820 (1993)—freezing FRY Government financial assets, prohibiting the transit through any country of vessels owned by or registered in the FRY, and strictly limiting the flow of goods through the FRY.<sup>40</sup> In July 1994 Milosevic accepted the Contact Group peace plan of May 1994—which proposed the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two halves, with 49 per cent of its territory controlled by Bosnian Serbs and 51 per cent to the Bosnian–Croat Federation—and publicly abandoned his erstwhile clients, imposing an economic blockade on the Bosnian Serbs and banning leading members of its government from entering the FRY.<sup>41</sup> As a result of these actions, the UNSC simultaneously passed resolutions 942 and 943 easing certain restrictions against the FRY while extending the full range of economic sanctions to Bosnian Serb controlled territory.<sup>42</sup>

Following a mortar attack on Sarajevo in February 1994 that killed 68 people, NATO declared an ‘exclusion zone’ for heavy weaponry around Sarajevo and warned Bosnian Serb commanders that their forces would be attacked from the air if they did not

<sup>33</sup> Hunter, T., ‘The embargo that wasn’t: Iran’s arms shipments into Bosnia’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, Dec. 1997, p. 539.

<sup>34</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 47/21, ‘The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 18 Dec. 1992.

<sup>35</sup> Doherty, C. J., ‘Panel adds funds to arm Bosnia foreign aid authorisation’, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 6 Dec. 1993; and Cassata, D., ‘Congress bucks White House, devises its own Bosnia plan’, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 6 Oct. 1995.

<sup>36</sup> US Department of State, ‘Explanation of US Vote on Lifting Arms Embargo Against Bosnia’, 29 Jun. 1993.

<sup>37</sup> Tierny, D., ‘Irrelevant or Malevolent? UN arms embargoes in civil wars’, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4 (2004), pp. 645–664, p. 658.

<sup>38</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 757, 30 May 1992.

<sup>39</sup> Stremlau (note 6), p. 27

<sup>40</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 787, 16 Nov. 1992; and UN Security Council Resolution 820, 17 Apr. 1993.

<sup>41</sup> Glenny (note 2), p. 278.

<sup>42</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 942, 23 Sep. 1994; and UN Security Council Resolution 943, 23 Sep. 1994.

withdraw.<sup>43</sup> Following another mortar attack on a Sarajevo marketplace in August 1995, NATO launched air strikes on Bosnian Serb-held positions around Sarajevo. Between 30 August and 17 September NATO warplanes flew more than 3500 sorties, forcing the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons. The combined effect of the bombing raids and a Croatian and Bosnian military offensive led to a reduction of Bosnian Serb held territory from 70 per cent of Bosnia to approximately 49 per cent, in line with the percentage specified in the Contact Group peace plan. In October 1995 the warring parties agreed to a ceasefire and in November, the presidents of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia initialled a peace accord at a US Air Force base near Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Agreement was formally signed in Paris in December 1995, dictating a formally united Bosnia and Herzegovina made up of two ‘entities’, the Bosnian–Croat Federation and the Serb Republic. Following the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the UNSC passed Resolution 1021 laying out the terms for the phased lifting of the arms embargo.<sup>44</sup> In June 1996 the sanctions committee announced that the arms embargo had been fully lifted. On the same day as Resolution 1021 was passed, the UNSC also passed Resolution 1022 lifting most of the sanctions against the FRY. Economic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs remained in place until February 1996.<sup>45</sup>

### Enforcement mechanisms

In December 1991 the UNSC passed Resolution 724 creating a sanctions committee with a mandate to ensure implementation of the UN arms embargo.<sup>46</sup> The committee was tasked only with collecting and distributing information and had no independent investigative capabilities, and no powers to sanction embargo violators.<sup>47</sup> An enforcement mechanism for Resolution 713 was adopted in November 1992 via Resolution 787, which called on member states to halt arms shipments by sea.<sup>48</sup> In March 1993 the UNSC passed Resolution 816, permitting military action by the UN against ‘fixed wing and rotary aircraft’ if prior permission was granted by UNPROFOR.<sup>49</sup>

Following the introduction of economic sanctions against the FRY, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the EC established a network of sanctions assistance missions (SAMs). The first three of these missions—in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania—started in October 1992. Additional SAMs were located in Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine, and, by mid-1995, the network had a staff of 250.<sup>50</sup> In addition, the Western European Union (WEU) established a Danube Patrol Mission of eight patrol boats in April 1993, while NATO and the WEU established a combined naval task force in the Adriatic in June 1993.<sup>51</sup> Following the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group peace plan in July 1994, Milosevic invited UN observers to monitor the implementation of FRY-imposed economic blockade of the Bosnian

<sup>43</sup> Malcolm (note 2), p. 255.

<sup>44</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1021, 22 Nov. 1995.

<sup>45</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1022, 22 Nov. 1995.

<sup>46</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 724, 27 Nov. 1991.

<sup>47</sup> Anthony, I. et al., ‘Arms Production and Arms Trade’, *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), p. 419.

<sup>48</sup> Resolution 787 (note 40).

<sup>49</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 816, 31 Mar. 1993.

<sup>50</sup> Stremlau (note 6), p. 48.

<sup>51</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 6), p. 69.

Serbs.<sup>52</sup> The International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) Monitoring Mission was established in September 1994 to police the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY.

In November 1994, under pressure from the US Congress, the Clinton Administration announced that it would no longer assist with the enforcement of the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, the US Government stressed that it would continue to comply with the UN arms embargo and would also continue to assist with the enforcement of all other sanction measures against the former SFRY.<sup>53</sup>

The participation of the OSCE,<sup>54</sup> EC, WEU and NATO was unprecedented in a sanctions monitoring process and a number of official reports have applauded the effectiveness of the effort. According to an official UN report, the unique and unprecedented inter-institutional cooperation was ‘the main reason for the effectiveness of the sanctions in the case of the former Yugoslavia’.<sup>55</sup> Other assessments have been less positive. Despite the international effort, weak enforcement at key land borders and an exemptions process in New York largely unable to deal with the quantity of requests, meant that goods continued to flow into the FRY.<sup>56</sup> The border with Macedonia was particularly porous. According to the UN sanctions committee over 300 companies were involved in sanctions violations, with the situation deteriorating significantly after 1994.<sup>57</sup> Meanwhile, clandestine trade from Bulgaria to Serbia reached more than \$5 billion in 1994.<sup>58</sup> In addition, despite the sanctions, oil shipments to the FRY continued with Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania all acting as either conduits or suppliers in the clandestine trade.<sup>59</sup>

### **Arms transfers during the arms embargo**

Transfers to the former SFRY during the period it was under UN arms embargo ranged from clandestine deals organized by smuggling networks to transfers organized and carried out by government officials with the full knowledge of the relevant authorities. Through these means, all parties to the Yugoslav conflict violated the embargo, shifting large quantities of light and heavy weaponry into the region.

#### *Bosnia and Herzegovina*

As noted, a significant proportion of the Yugoslav defence industry was based in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Shortly after the outbreak of war, Serb and Croat forces took control of many of the more important and technically advanced production facilities. For

<sup>52</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 6), p. 68.

<sup>53</sup> Watson, R., ‘Opting out on the Adriatic’, *Newsweek*, 21 Nov. 1994, pp. 28–29.

<sup>54</sup> The CSCE became the OSCE—Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—on 1 January 1995.

<sup>55</sup> United Nations, Letter dated 24 September 1996 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Document S/1996/776, 24 Sep. 1996.

<sup>56</sup> Strelau (note 6), pp. 29, 48.

<sup>57</sup> United Nations, Letter dated 15 November 1996 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee, Established Pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991) Concerning Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Document S/1996/946, 15 Nov. 1996.

<sup>58</sup> Dadak, C., ‘The 1992–1996 Bulgarian Trade Data Puzzle: A Case of Sanctions Breaking’, *Cato Journal*, vol. 22, no. 3 (2003).

<sup>59</sup> Andreas, P., ‘Criminalizing consequences of sanctions: embargo busting and its legacy’, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 49 (2005), p. 345.

example, Serb forces quickly commandeered the ‘Kozmos’ facility outside Banja Luka which produced guided missiles and the ‘Orao’ aircraft engineering plant near Sarajevo.<sup>60</sup> A number of armament factories lay within Bosnian Government-controlled territories, and production in certain areas was maintained or later restarted.<sup>61</sup> For example, in 1994 the Bosnian Government announced that, thanks to a supply of spare parts from Iraq, it had been able to restart production of the 262-mm Orkan multiple rocket launcher.<sup>62</sup>

**Table 2.** Summary of possible/suspected sources and secondary support for arms transfers to the former Yugoslavia during the arms embargo

Recipient	Source of arms	Secondary support	Non-state actors
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Argentina, China, Central and Eastern Europe	Brunei, Croatia, Slovenia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, the USA	TWRA, brokers
Bosnian Serb forces	FRY, Israel, Russia, Ukraine	..	Brokers
Bosnian Croat forces	Croatia	..	..
Croatia	Argentina, Germany (FRG), Russia, South Africa, Central and Eastern Europe	Hungary, Slovenia	Brokers
Croatian Serb forces	FRY	..	..
FRY	Slovenia, Central and Eastern Europe		Brokers
Slovenia	..	..	..

Bosnian forces were disadvantaged by the physical location of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was bordered by Croatia and the FRY. To obtain certain key armaments, including most types of heavy weaponry, Bosnian forces were largely dependent on shipments from two sources—via the smuggling network created by the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) or large-scale shipments from Iran.

The TWRA was founded in 1987 in Vienna as a humanitarian agency for Muslims. In 1992 it opened offices in Sarajevo and began to cooperate with the Bosnian Government, quickly becoming the main organizer of arms shipments to Bosnian forces. Between 1992 and 1995 around \$350 million was deposited in a Viennese TWRA bank account, of which around half was used to purchase arms for Bosnian forces. Benefactors included Brunei, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.<sup>63</sup> The majority of weapons bound for Bosnian forces were sourced from former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states and were transported by air to Slovenia for onward shipment to Bosnia and Herzegovina, via Croatia. During August and September 1992

<sup>60</sup> Vego, M., ‘The Muslim defence industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, May 1994, p. 213.

<sup>61</sup> Vego (note 60), p. 214; and Dzanic, E., ‘The fall and rise of Bosnia’s war machine,’ *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, Jan. 1997, pp. 23–24.

<sup>62</sup> ‘Arms to former Yugoslavia,’ *Jane’s Global Update*, no. 2, 1994.

<sup>63</sup> Pomfret, J., ‘Bosnia’s Muslims dodged embargo,’ *Washington Post*, 22 Sep. 1996, p. A1.

more than 120 tonnes of weapons were shipped along this route, including rifles, mortars, mines, and ammunition.<sup>64</sup> By late 1992 Croatian forces controlling the transport routes began to demand 50 to 70 per cent of the arms shipments that they permitted to transit Croatian territory.<sup>65</sup> Following the outbreak of fighting between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian forces in late 1992, arms had to be shipped by more dangerous air routes directly into Bosnia and Herzegovina. The TWRA is also reported to have purchased \$15 million of light weapons with the involvement of Turkish and Malaysian peacekeeping troops; it is even claimed that they facilitated the purchase of arms and ammunition in Serbia.<sup>66</sup>

TWRA activities began to decline in 1994, at which time Iran emerged as the main supplier of arms to Bosnian forces.<sup>67</sup> According to media reports, between 1994 and 1996 Iran shipped between \$150 and \$200 million worth of arms and ammunition into Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>68</sup> These shipments included large quantities of TNT, C4 plastic explosives along with fuses, 122-mm shell propellant and 120-mm and 130-mm shell cases.<sup>69</sup> Following the signing of the Washington Agreement in March 1994, Bosnian and Croat forces began to again cooperate against the Serbs and the supply of weapons improved.<sup>70</sup> Plane loads of Iranian arms began arriving at Zagreb airport, for onward shipment to Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>71</sup> The number of flights ferrying arms and ammunition quickly reached an average of eight per month, with 30 per cent of the arms handed over to Croatia as payment for facilitating the deliveries.<sup>72</sup> Iran also played a role in training Bosnian forces, with the CIA estimating that as many as 400 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were dispatched to Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>73</sup>

The role played by the USA in the shipment of arms to Bosnian forces has long been hotly debated. The US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, is widely credited with playing a key role in forging the Bosnian–Croat Federation, partly as a means of reopening supply routes into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the signing of the deal, Croatian President Tudjman asked Ambassador Galbraith for the US position on Croatia acting as a conduit for arms shipments. Under instruction from Washington, Galbraith told Tudjman that the USA took no position, thereby signalling US approval.<sup>74</sup> The US Government later acknowledged that it had allowed deliveries to Bosnian and Croatian forces to take place, even though it knew that these violated the UN arms embargo.<sup>75</sup>

More contentious is the allegation that the USA participated directly in the shipping of arms to Bosnia forces. Newspaper reports to this effect began to emerge in 1994,

<sup>64</sup> Pomfret (note 63).

<sup>65</sup> Woodward (note 2), p. 264.

<sup>66</sup> *Srebrenica* (note 12).

<sup>67</sup> According to the Austrian investigation, \$231 million were deposited in the Viennese account in 1993, while in 1994 and 1995, the amount was only \$39 million. Hajdinjak, M., 'Smuggling in Southeast Europe: the Yugoslav wars and the development of regional criminal networks in the Balkans', Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002, <<http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=12854>>, p. 11.

<sup>68</sup> Hunter (note 33), p. 539.

<sup>69</sup> Hunter (note 33), p. 539.

<sup>70</sup> Malcolm (note 2), p. 249.

<sup>71</sup> Liu, M. and Dickey, C., 'A call to open arms', *Newsweek*, 3 Jun. 1996.

<sup>72</sup> Hunter (note 33), p. 539.

<sup>73</sup> Hunter (note 33), p. 540.

<sup>74</sup> US Congress, Select Committee on Intelligence US Senate, 'U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers to the Bosnian Army, 1994–1995', Nov. 1996, <[http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996\\_rpt/bosnia.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_rpt/bosnia.htm)>.

<sup>75</sup> US Congress (note 74).

quoting UNPROFOR troops as well as French, British and other European officials.<sup>76</sup> The most detailed allegations relate to a series of arms deliveries during February and March 1995 involving C-130 cargo planes flying night-time air drops to Tuzla air base in East Bosnia, the so-called 'Black flights to Tuzla'. Many eyewitnesses described the drops, with numerous sources claiming they were US arms deliveries, possibly made with the involvement of private US companies. Other sources claimed that the C-130 planes were Turkish but that the deliveries were made with an element of 'logistical patronage' by the USA. The US Government has always denied that it was directly engaged in arming Bosnian forces until after the UN arms embargo was lifted.<sup>77</sup>

For the duration of the arms embargo period Bosnian Serb forces received arms and support from the FRY—directly from the YNA and indirectly from groups and individuals sympathetic to their cause. From September 1991 to April 1992, the YNA continued to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, openly cooperating with Bosnian Serb forces and supplying them with arms and ammunition. Following the creation of the FRY in April 1992, Milosevic announced that he would withdraw all YNA troops who were citizens of the new state. During the withdrawal, the YNA is reported to have transferred most of its deployed troops and weapons to the Bosnian Serb forces.<sup>78</sup> In addition, Serbian armed forces continued to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina and both they and the Bosnian Serb forces continued to receive constant supplies of ammunition, food and fuel from the FRY.<sup>79</sup> The July 1994 blockade led to some reduction in supplies, although the extent to which they were truly curtailed is disputed. According to one report, in spite of the UN monitoring mission, regular night time shipments continued.<sup>80</sup> Bosnian Serb forces are also reported to have received weapons shipments organized by Russian intermediaries, including D-30 artillery pieces and T-72 tanks.<sup>81</sup> In addition, there are reports that the intelligence services of Ukraine, Greece and Israel, supplied arms to Bosnian Serb forces.<sup>82</sup>

Following the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Croat forces acquired large quantities of small arms and some heavy weapons from Croatia. These supply lines continued to operate throughout the conflict.<sup>83</sup>

### *Croatia and Slovenia*

Despite lacking the pre-war arms industry facilities of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia produced arms domestically during the embargo period. By 1993, it was reported that Croatia was producing four types of sub-machine gun, an 82-mm mortar, rockets, and almost all the ammunition for their small arms, anti-aircraft guns and mortars.<sup>84</sup> More significantly, Croatia was also able to import large amounts of weaponry from the outside world, thanks to its extensive coastline and porous borders with Hungary and Slovenia.<sup>85</sup> Estimates of the amount of arms imported during the arms

<sup>76</sup> US Congress (note 74).

<sup>77</sup> *Srebrenica* (note 12).

<sup>78</sup> Woodward (note 2), p. 292.

<sup>79</sup> Malcolm (note 2), p. 239; and Woodward (note 2), p. 264.

<sup>80</sup> *Srebrenica* (note 12).

<sup>81</sup> 'Arms to former Yugoslavia' (note 62).

<sup>82</sup> *Srebrenica* (note 12).

<sup>83</sup> Vego, M., 'The Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Mar. 1993, p. 101.

<sup>84</sup> Vego (note 14), p. 208.

<sup>85</sup> Lukic and Lynch (note 1), p. 297.

embargo period differ widely. According to the Croatian newspaper *Globus*, between late 1991 and early 1995 the government in Zagreb spent \$5.5 billion on arms purchases.<sup>86</sup> A significant share of the funds for these purchases came from the Croatian diaspora, which was reportedly the largest and best organized of the Yugoslav successor states.<sup>87</sup>

During the arms embargo there were two main sources for arms smuggled into Croatia.<sup>88</sup> The first major source was former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states. The majority of these entered Croatia by land via Slovenia and Hungary using smuggling routes developed and controlled by former members of the YNA and Yugoslav secret service of Croat origin.<sup>89</sup> For the most part, these networks were able to access army stocks via corrupt government officials and military personnel. In one well documented case arms were shipped from the Polish state-owned company Cenrex to Croatia through the use of end-user certificates provided by officials from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Latvia.<sup>90</sup> During the embargo period, Croatia also imported MiG-21 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Mi-8 transport helicopters and Mi-24 combat helicopters. Aside from a number of Mi-8 helicopters, which are known to have been supplied by Russia, the origin of these weapons and the exact numbers involved have never been firmly established, though certain items were claimed to be either ex-GDR or ex-Ukrainian.<sup>91</sup> Croatia was also able to obtain anti-tank and air-to-air missiles, and T-55 tanks.<sup>92</sup>

A second major source of arms was South America, particularly Argentina. Arms shipments from Argentina were approved by President Carlos Menem with members of the Croatian émigré community in South America helping to organize the transfer. In late 1991 President Menem authorized the transfer of 6500 tonnes of weapons to Panama. The consignment was diverted and shipped to Croatia. In 1992, Menem authorized the sale of \$51 million worth of weapons to Bolivia. This transfer was also diverted to Croatia.<sup>93</sup> A third, and relatively minor source of arms for Croatia, was South Africa. For the most part, these shipments consisted of R-4 rifles produced by the state-owned company Armscor.<sup>94</sup>

Following the establishment of UNPROFOR in Croatia, all YNA units stationed in Croatia began to be gradually withdrawn. However, many troops remained and some heavy weapons were transferred to local Croatian Serb forces, including mortars, artillery systems, anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles, and Mi-8 and 'Partizan'

<sup>86</sup> Glenny (note 2), p. 283.

<sup>87</sup> Hajdinjak (note 67), p. 9.

<sup>88</sup> For a more detailed discussion of arms transfers to Croatia during the arms embargo period see, Hajdinjak, (note 67); Berghezan, G., *Ex-Yougoslavie, L'Embargo sur les armes et le rearmement actuel*, (GRIP: Brussels, 1997); Lionis, A., 'Croatia Improves its Inventory', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Dec. 1995, pp. 545–546; and Wood, B. and Peleman, J., *The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents* (BASIC, NISAT and PRIO: Washington, DC and London, Nov. 1999), <<http://www.nisat.org>>.

<sup>89</sup> Silber and Little (note 2), pp. 116–117.

<sup>90</sup> For more information on these deals, see Holtom, P., *Arms Transit Trade in the Baltic region*, (Saferworld: London, 2003), pp. 64–66.

<sup>91</sup> Lionis (note 88); 'Balkan air power analysis', *Air Forces Monthly*, Jun. 1999, pp. 74–80, p. 77.

<sup>92</sup> Lionis (note 88).

<sup>93</sup> Wood and Peleman (note 88); 'Arms and the men', *The Economist*, 12 Sep. 1998, p. 60; 'Illegal arms sales test for Menem', *The Independent*, 27 Oct. 1998, p. 15; 'US denies knew of Argentine arms sales to Croatia', *Reuters*, 7 Oct. 1998; and 'Argentina's Menem backs ministers in arms scandal', *Reuters*, 9 Sep. 1998.

<sup>94</sup> Berghezan (note 88), p. 9.

helicopters.<sup>95</sup> Croatian Serb forces continued to receive financial and military support from Belgrade during the ceasefire period but by the time Croatian troops overran Serb-held positions in 1995, the Croatian Serbs had been effectively abandoned by Belgrade. Captured documents showed that Croatian Serb forces had continued to receive financial assistance, as well as help from communications technicians and other military specialists, but little else.<sup>96</sup>

The war in Slovenia was over before the arms embargo was imposed. In spite of this Slovenia continued to receive arms during the embargo period and act as a conduit and a source for transfers to other former Yugoslav Republics.

### *Serbia and Montenegro (FRY)*

Since it inherited the lion's share of YNA forces and the majority of the former SFRY's arms industry, the arms embargo was always going to have limited effect on the FRY, as compared to the other former Yugoslav republics. Even in situations where production was disrupted, the FRY was often able to replace lost capabilities and keep the lines running.<sup>97</sup> Indeed, the FRY was so successful in this regard that it is reported to have sought to export weapons during the conflict.<sup>98</sup>

Despite these advantages, there were a number of reported cases of weapons shipments to the FRY during the arms embargo, indicating that the arms industry was not entirely self-sufficient. Alleged deals involved a group of Russian officers selling surplus equipment from bases in Germany and a group of Bulgarian officers who sold \$670 000 worth of military equipment in 1993.<sup>99</sup> In addition, companies in Slovenia are believed to have supplied fire-control systems for M-84 tanks as well aircraft components.<sup>100</sup>

## V. Lifting the arms embargo

Resolution 1021 of November 1995 laid out the road map for the gradual suspension of the arms embargo. Ninety days after all parties formally signed the Dayton Agreement, the arms embargo was to be partially lifted, although restrictions on transfers of heavy weapons, heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft and helicopters would remain in place. Annex 1B of the Dayton Agreement (the Agreement on Regional Stabilization), which outlined a set of arms control measures, came into force 180 days later, enabling the arms embargo to be completely lifted.<sup>101</sup> The Agreement on Regional Stabilization contained a detailed package of arms related confidence building measures, including exchanges of information, restrictions on force training and deployments, monitoring of arms production facilities, and maintenance of agreed limits for each country's holdings of tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat

<sup>95</sup> Vego (note 20), p. 444.

<sup>96</sup> Malcolm (note 2), p. 261.

<sup>97</sup> Watkins, A., 'Yugoslav industry revival: fact ... or fiction?', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 July 2001, p. 20–22.

<sup>98</sup> Lukic and Lynch (note 1), p. 246.

<sup>99</sup> 'Arms profiteering', *Armed Forces Journal*, 1 Feb. 1995, p. 45; and 'Three Bulgarian officers charged with arms smuggling to Serbia', *AlbaNews*, 28 Aug. 1995, <<http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9508E&L=albanews&P=R980>>.

<sup>100</sup> Milivojevic, M., 'Slovenia—an arms bazaar', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Nov. 1994, p. 496.

<sup>101</sup> United Nations (note 44).

aircraft, and combat helicopters.<sup>102</sup> In June 1996 the sanctions committee announced that the arms embargo had been fully lifted.

### Arms transfers after the arms embargo

Following the lifting of the arms embargo, all states party to the conflict sought to replenish supplies and build up their military forces. Bosnia and Herzegovina imported large amounts of equipment, including armoured vehicles, artillery pieces and helicopters from multiple sources, including Egypt, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the USA. Much of the equipment from the Muslim world came in the form of military aid, while Bosnia and Herzegovina also benefited from a substantial ‘train and equip’ programme funded by the USA. Despite these transfers, the arms control element of the Dayton Agreement is generally seen to have proven successful with parties holding to agreed force limits and cooperating with inspection visits. While problems did emerge in the agreement’s implementation, these were mainly due to technical problems rather than a lack of political will.<sup>103</sup>

**Table 3.** Summary of possible/suspected sources and secondary support for arms transfers to the former Yugoslavia after the arms embargo

Recipient	Source of arms	Secondary support	Non-state actors
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Egypt, Qatar, Romania, Russia, UAE, USA	USA	..
Croatia	Canada, Switzerland, USA	..	..
FRY	Russia, Ukraine	..	..
Slovenia	Canada, Israel, Switzerland	..	..

## VI. Conclusions

The arms embargo did little to stop the flow of arms to the warring parties. Via covert government supplies and the black market, all sides to the conflict were, to a greater and lesser extent, able to gain access to arms and military equipment during the arms embargo period. The ease with which the arms embargo was violated can be attributed to a number of factors. First, despite the development of new methods for sanctions monitoring, actual enforcement of the arms embargo was weak. Second, warring parties were able to employ and create clandestine networks for the procurement of arms on the black market. Third, large numbers of states—for ideological, political or economic reasons—were willing to violate the arms embargo, assist others in breaking it, or inhibit attempts at more effective enforcement. The only area where the arms embargo may have been effective was in restricting the flow of arms to Bosnian forces. However, the majority of commentators have argued that the arms embargo was fundamentally

<sup>102</sup> ‘The general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 1B—Agreement on Regional Stabilization’, <<http://www.oscebih.org/overview/gfap/eng/annex1b.asp>>.

<sup>103</sup> Lachowski, Z., *Confidence and Security Building Measures in the New Europe* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, SIPRI Research Report No. 18, 2003), pp. 155–170.

unjust because it locked in place the pre-war balance of power, unfairly disadvantaged the Bosnian forces, and thereby unnecessarily prolonged the conflict.<sup>104</sup> If not for the widespread breaches of the arms embargo, it is likely that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been dismembered.

With regards to the wider economic sanctions, opinions differ as regards their impact on the outcome of the Yugoslav wars. By the time trade sanctions were imposed in May 1992 the FRY was already suffering severe dislocation due to several factors including the war, the collapse of inter-republic trade, uneven attempts at market reform, and large numbers of refugees.<sup>105</sup> Combined with economic sanctions, this led to a virtual collapse of the economy producing record inflation and unemployment.<sup>106</sup> A government instituted economic reform programme introduced in January 1994 had a limited stabilizing effect but by the end of the year production was again declining and prices were continuing to rise.<sup>107</sup> Many Western officials involved in the negotiating processes credit the economic sanctions with driving a wedge between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb administration, thereby hastening a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the signing of the Dayton Agreement, US President Clinton declared that sanctions ‘virtually broke Serbia’s resolve’ and that the threat of their resumption would be a major element in ensuring the success of the peace agreement.<sup>108</sup> An official UN report concluded that the economic sanctions against the FRY ‘may well have been the single most important reason for the Government in Belgrade changing its policies and accepting a negotiated peace agreement in Dayton’.<sup>109</sup> Other commentators have argued that the hardships brought on by the sanctions served only to strengthen Milosevic’s grip on power and thereby prolonged the conflict.<sup>110</sup>

One by-product of the economic sanctions and the arms embargo was a dramatic strengthening of regional criminal networks and the corrupting of government officials.<sup>111</sup> In order to bypass the embargo, governments formed ties with organized crime, which had had a corrupting impact on officials and state institutions and strengthened domestic criminal networks. In addition, the process created arms smuggling networks which went on to supply arms to embargoed destinations around the world long after the cessation of hostilities in the former SFRY.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Jackson, R., ‘Armed humanitarianism’, *International Journal*, vol. 48, no. 3 (1993), p. 600; Ramet, S., ‘Bosnian war and diplomacy of accommodation’, *Current History*, vol. 80 (1994), p. 385; and Malcolm (note 2), p. 245.

<sup>105</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 6), p. 73.

<sup>106</sup> Strelau (note 6), p. 48.

<sup>107</sup> Cortright and Lopez (note 6), p. 74.

<sup>108</sup> Strelau (note 6), p. 48.

<sup>109</sup> United Nations (note 55).

<sup>110</sup> Licht, S., ‘The use of sanctions in former Yugoslavia’, eds D. Cortright and G. A. Lopez, *Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?* (Westview Press: Boulder, Colo., 1995), pp. 153–160, 158; and Woodward (note 2), p. 294.

<sup>111</sup> For example, see Hajdinjak (note 67); and Andreas (note 59), p. 352.

<sup>112</sup> Hajdinjak (note 67), p. 6.

## Chronology

Dates directly related to the UNSC arms embargo are highlighted in bold.

May 1990	Multiparty elections in Croatia and Slovenia bring gains for nationalist and pro-independence parties
November 1990	Multiparty elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the majority of votes going to nationalist parties representing each of the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats
25 June 1991	Croatia and Slovenia declare independence
<b>25 September 1991</b>	UNSC passes Resolution 713, imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia; calling for an immediate ceasefire; giving full support to European Community (EC) and CSCE efforts to negotiate an end to war in Croatia
15 October 1991	Bosnia and Herzegovina declares independence
<b>15 December 1991</b>	UNSC passes Resolution 724, creating a sanctions committee with a mandate to ensure implementation of the arms embargo
23 December 1991	Germany recognizes Croatia and Slovenia as independent states
<b>8 January 1992</b>	UNSC passes Resolution 727, explicitly extending the coverage of the arms embargo to Yugoslavia's successor states
15 January 1992	The EC recognizes Croatia and Slovenia as independent states
6 April 1992	The EC and the USA recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state
27 April 1992	The republics of Serbia and Montenegro declare themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
15 May 1992	UNSC passes Resolution 752, demanding that all parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina end military hostilities and cease interference in each others' affairs, and that units of the YNA be withdrawn
22 May 1992	Via Resolutions 46/236, 46/237 and 46/238 the UN General Assembly admits Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the UN
30 May 1992	UNSC passes Resolution 757, banning all international trade with FRY; prohibiting air travel; blocking financial transactions; banning sporting and cultural exchanges; suspending scientific and technical cooperation. The resolution allows for the transshipment of goods through FRY and makes exemptions for certain humanitarian goods
16 June 1992	Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman sign a formal military alliance between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia legitimizing the use of Croatian army troops and the local HVO forces
<b>15 November 1992</b>	UNSC passes Resolution 787, prohibiting the transshipment of strategic goods through Yugoslavia and halts all maritime shipping on the Danube. Also calls on states to halt arms shipments by sea
<b>31 March 1993</b>	UNSC passes Resolution 816, permitting military action by the UN against 'fixed wing and rotary aircraft' if prior permission was granted by UNPROFOR
17 April 1993	UNSC passes Resolution 820, freezing FRY Government financial assets; prohibiting the transit through any country of vessels owned by

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	or registered in Yugoslavia; further limiting the transshipment of goods through Yugoslavia
May 1993	Tabling of the Vance–Owen plan in May 1993. The plan sought to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into ten ethnically-based provinces
5 February 1994	Mortar attack in Sarajevo kills 68 people
1 March 1994	Washington Agreement is signed, marking the creation of a Croat–Bosnian federation paving the way for the resumption of arms shipments to the Bosnian army
May 1994	Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the USA put forward the Contact Group proposal, which preserves the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina but divides the country into two halves, with 49 per cent to the Serbs and 51 per cent to the Federation
July 1994	The Bosnian Serb Government rejects the Contact Group proposal
19-20 August 1994	Referendum held in Bosnian Serb territory, rejecting the Contact Group proposal
23 September 1994	UNSC passes Resolution 942, extending the full range of sanctions in pace against FRY to Bosnian Serb-controlled territory
23 September 1994	UNSC passes Resolution 943, easing some of the restrictions on FRY. This includes suspending the sanctions on air and ferry services between Montenegro and Italy and the ban on sporting and cultural events
1–2 May 1995	Croatian Army units take over key positions in the Serb-held areas of Western Slavonia, quickly bringing the area under Croatian Government control
July 1995	An estimated 8000 Bosniak males, in the region of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are massacred by Bosnian Serb forces
28 August 1995	Mortar attack on a Sarajevo market place kills 38 people
30 August 1995	NATO launches Operation Deliberate Force, an 11 day bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb positions
21 November 1995	The Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the FRY initial the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement)
<b>22 November 1995</b>	UNSC passes Resolution 1021, stipulating the terms and time-frame of terminating the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia
22 November 1995	UNSC passes Resolution 1022, suspending indefinitely most of the sanctions against the FRY. Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs are kept in place pending the fulfilment of certain obligations
14 December 1995	The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement) signed in Paris
27 February 1996	Following their withdrawal of forces from the zones of separation established in the Dayton Agreement, all sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs are suspended
<b>18 June 1996</b>	The President of Security Council and the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee state that all provisions of the arms embargo have been terminated

## Glossary

CFE Treaty	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
EC	European Community
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ICFY	The International Commission on Former Yugoslavia
SAMs	Sanctions Assistance Missions
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
TDF	Territorial Defence Force
TWRA	Third World Relief Agency
UNPA	UN Protected Areas
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WEU	Western European Union
YNA	Yugoslav National Army

## Register of arms transfers

Table 4. Transfers prior to the UN arms embargo period, January 1994–June 1996

Recipient/ supplier (S)	No. delivered	Weapon	Year(s) of deliveries	Comments	Source
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>					
S: Slovenia	..	Various	1991		Malcolm, <i>Bosnia: A Short History</i> (Macmillan, 1994)
<b>Bosnia/Serbs</b>					
S: FRY	..	Various	1991	Ex-YNA	Malcolm
<b>Croatia</b>					
S: Hungary	10 000 –30 000	AK-47 rifles	1990		'Hungarian daily 'Nepszabadsag' exposes arms sales to Croatia', <i>Eastern European Report</i> , July 1995
Lebanon	..	Various	1990–91	\$100 million of equipment; Sourced from Christian militias	<i>International Herald Tribune</i> , 2 July 1991
<b>Croatia/Serbs</b>					
S: FRY	..	Various rifles	1990–91	Ex-YNA	Vego, 'The Army of Serbian Krajina', <i>JIR</i> , Oct. 1993
	..	Some armoured vehicles	1990–91	Ex-YNA	Vego
<b>Slovenia</b>					
S: Hungary	..	AMD-65 Rifles	1990–91		Beaver, 'Slovene force's imported arms', <i>JDW</i> , 13 July 1991
Unknown country	..	Armbrust Anti-tank	1990–91	Possibly from Singapore	Beaver

**Table 5.** Transfers during the UN arms embargo period, September 1991–June 1996

Recipient/ supplier (S)	No. delivered	Weapon	Year(s) of deliveries	Comments	Source
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>					
S: China	(10)	WZ-91/TYPE-92 Tank destroyer (M)	1993–94	Status uncertain; possibly delivered via Middle Eastern country	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	(300)	RED ARROW-8 Anti-tank missile	1993–94	Incl for WZ-91 tank-destroyer; possibly delivered via Middle Eastern country	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Iran	..	TNT, C4 plastic explosives, fuzes, 122 mm shell propellant and 120- and 130-mm shell cases	1994–1996	Part of estimated \$150–200 million of shipments by Iran	Hunter, 'The embargo that wasn't', <i>JIR</i> , Dec. 1997
Unknown country	..	Assault rifles, mortars, mines and ammunition	1992	120 tonnes of equipment; sourced in former Eastern bloc countries; delivered via Sudan, Slovenia, and Croatia; organized by TWRA	Pomfret, 'Bosnia's muslims dodged embargo', <i>Washington Post</i> , 22 Sep. 1996
	..	Some light weapons	1993	Estimated \$15 million deal; sourced in former Eastern bloc countries; organized by TWRA	Pomfret
	(10)	Type-63 107mm MRL	1993–94	Probably second-hand; supplier may be Iran	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
<b>Bosnia/Serbs</b>					
S: FRY	..	Various	1991–1995		Malcolm, <i>Bosnia: A Short History</i> (Macmillan, 1994)
Unknown country	..	D-30 122mm artillery	1994	Supplied by individuals within Russian army; sourced in former Eastern bloc countries; unconfirmed reports	'Arms to former Yugoslavia', <i>Jame's</i> <i>Global Update</i> , no. 2, 1994
	(20)	T-72 tanks	1994	Supplied by individuals within Russian army; sourced in former Eastern bloc countries; unconfirmed reports	'Arms to former Yugoslavia'
<b>Bosnia/Croats</b>					
S: Croatia	..	Various	1992–1995		Vego, 'The Croatian Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina', <i>JIR</i> , Mar. 1993

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Recipient/ supplier (S)	No. delivered	Weapon	Year(s) of deliveries	Comments	Source
<b>Croatia</b>					
<b>S: Argentina</b>					
	..	Various	1991	6500 tonnes; shipment to Panama, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman, <i>The Arms Fixers</i> , (BASIC, PRIO, NISAT, 1999)
	8 000	Some automatic rifles	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
	18	155-mm artillery pieces	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
	2 000	Automatic pistols	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
	211 000	Hand grenades	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
	3 000	Pampero rockets	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
	30 000	Rifle grenades	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
	3 000	Some mines	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
	60	Mortars	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
	Several million	Ammunition rounds	1992	Part of \$51 million deal; shipment to Bolivia, diverted to Croatia	Wood and Peleman
Germany (FRG)	(25)	BT-6L diesels engine	1993-97	For LOV APC produced in Croatia	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Russia	(20)	Mi-8/Mi-17/Hip-H	1992-93	Second-hand	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
South Africa	..	R-4 assault rifles	..	Delivered via other African states	Berghezan, <i>Ex-Yugoslavia</i> , <i>L'Embargo sur les armes et le rearmement actuel</i> , Grip, 1997
Unknown country	(60)	T-55 tanks	1991	Possibly ex-GDR	Lionis, 'Croatia improves its inventory', <i>JIR</i> , Dec. 1995
	(10)	Type-63 107mm MRL	1993	Probably second-hand; supplier may be Iran	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	40	MiG-21	(1993)	Possibly ex-GDR or ex-Ukraine; Dismantled prior to delivery;	'Arms to former Yugoslavia'
	(6)	MiG-29	1994	Second-hand	Lionis
	(50)	9M114/AT-6 Spiral Anti-tank missile	1994	For Mi-24 helicopters	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

(100)	MILAN Anti-tank missile	1994	Second-hand; supplier may be South Africa or FRG	'Croatia Improves its Inventory'
(5)	Mi-24D/Mi-25/Hind-D Combat helicopter	1994	Possibly ex-GDR or ex-Ukraine	'Croatia Improves its Inventory'
(10)	Mi-24V/Mi-35/Hind-E Combat helicopter	1994	Second-hand; possibly delivered as 'ambulance helicopters'	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
(24)	5V55K/SA-10A Grumble surface-to-air missiles	1995	Supplier possibly Ukraine; missiles and launchers delivered but rest of SAM system not delivered	'Croatia Improves its Inventory'
..	Various	1992-95	Ex-YNA	Malcolm
..	Mi-8 helicopters	(1992)	Ex-YNA	Vego
..	'Partizan' helicopters	(1992)	Ex-YNA	Vego
226	SA-16 portable SAMs	1995	Ex-Kazakh	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
..	Components for M-84 tanks and aircraft	..		Milivojevic, <i>Slovenia: An Arms Bazaar</i> , JIR, Nov. 1994
..	Various	..	Possibly ex-GDR, organized by Russian brokers	'Arms profiteering', <i>Armed Forces Journal</i> , 1 Feb. 1995

**Croatia/Serbs**

S: FRY

**FRY**

S: Kazakhstan

Slovenia

Unknown

Table 6. Transfers after the UN arms embargo period, June 1996–December 1999

Recipient/ supplier (S)	No. delivered	Weapon	Year(s) of deliveries	Comments	Source
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>					
S: Egypt	12	D-30 122-mm Towed gun	1996	Ex-Egyptian; aid; D-30M version	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	12	M-46 130-mm Towed gun	1996	Ex-Egyptian; aid; Type-59-IM version	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	10	T-55 Tank	1997	Ex-Egyptian	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Qatar	25	AMX-10P IFV	1999	Ex-Quatari; aid	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Romania	(18)	APR-40 122mm MRL	1997	Possibly financed by USA	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	(8)	M-46 130-mm Towed gun	1998	Ex-Romanian	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Russia	1	Mi-34S/Hermit Light helicopter	1998		SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
UAE	36	Model-56 105-mm Towed gun	1996	Ex-UAE; aid	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	(41)	AML-60/90 Armoured car	1997	Ex-UAE; 'Train and Equip Program' aid	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	(36)	AMX-30B Tank	1997	Ex-UAE; 'Train and Equip Program' aid	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
USA	80	M-113	1996	Ex-US; 'Train and Equip Program' aid; M-113A2 version	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	45	M-60A3 Patton-2	1996	Ex-US; 'Train and Equip Program' aid	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	(126)	M-114A1 155-mm Towed gun	1997	Ex-US; 'Train and Equip Program' aid	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	15	Bell-205 Helicopter	1999	Ex-US; 'Train and Equip Program' aid	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
<b>Croatia</b>					
S: Canada	20	PT-6 Turboprop	1996	For 20 PC-9/PC-9M trainer aircraft from Switzerland; PT-6A-62 version	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Switzerland	(20)	PC-9 Trainer aircraft	1996-97	Incl 3 second-hand (but not much used); incl 3 PC-9 and 17 PC-9M version	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
USA	10	Bell-206/OH-58 Light helicopter	1997	\$15 m deal; Bell-206B version; from Canadian production line	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Unknown country	(2)	An-32/Cline Transport aircraft	1996	Possibly second-hand	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

<b>FRY</b>						
<b>S: Russia</b>	1	Tamara Air surveillance system	1998	Ex-Russian; Status uncertain	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
Ukraine	2	MI-24 Combat helicopter	1997	Ex-Ukrainian; For police special forces	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
	2	MI-8 Helicopter	1998	Second-hand; For police special forces	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
	(31)	T-72 Tank	2001	Probably Ex-Ukrainian	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
<b>Slovenia</b>						
<b>S: Canada</b>	9	PT-6 Turboprop aircraft	1998-99	For PC-9M trainer aircraft from Switzerland	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
Israel	(56)	K-6 120-mm Mortar	1996		SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
	18	Model-839 155-mm Towed gun	1996-97		SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
Switzerland	2	PC-6B Turbo Porter light transport aircraft	1998		SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
	3	PC-9 Trainer aircraft	1995		SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	
	9	PC-9 Trainer aircraft	1998-99		SIPRI Arms Transfers Database	